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A PRIMER FOR THE NONMATHEMATICALLY
INCLINED ON MATHEMATICAL EVIDENCE IN
CRIMINAL CASES: PEOPLE V. COLLINS AND BEYOND
DAviD McColD*
Mathematics, a veritable sorcerer in our computerized society, while
assisting the trier of fact in the search for truth, must not cast a
spell over him.'
INTRODUCTION
An old hymn tells us, "Time, like an ever-rolling stream, bears all its
sons away. ' 2 This religious verity states an indisputable truth concerning
legal fact-finding processes: every event about which people litigate has been
"borne away" by time, so that what happened can never be exactly repro-
duced, but only imperfectly reconstructed through the residue that the event
left in the world-witnesses' memories, physical evidence, documents, and
the like. Thus, a factfinding process can never lead to an absolutely certain
conclusion. As Justice Harlan succinctly put it, "[In a judicial proceeding
in which there is a dispute about the facts of some earlier event, the factfinder
cannot acquire unassailably accurate knowledge of what happened. Instead,
all the factfinder can acquire is a belief of what probably happened. ' 3 The
legal system straightforwardly recognizes this inherent uncertainty through
the system's formulation of the burdens of persuasion: the burden in a
criminal case is not "beyond any doubt," but "beyond a reasonable doubt;
' 4
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1. People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 319, 438 P.2d 33, 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497, 497
(1968).
2. "0 God Our Help in Ages Past," The Methodist Hymnal, No. 28, stanza 5 (1966).
3. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
4. Prior to the seventeenth century in England, juries were often instructed to find guilt
in a criminal case only if there was no doubt. But with the advent in the 1600s and 1700s of
legal rules which excluded evidence that earlier would have been admissible, the system recognized
that absolute certainty had become impossible (indeed, it had never been possible in the first
place). By the late 1700s, the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard had displaced the "no
doubt" standard. Morano, A Reexamination of the Development of the Reasonable Doubt
Rule, 55 B.U.L. REv. 507 (1975).
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the burden in civil cases is not "to a certainty from the evidence," but "by
a preponderance of the evidence." Accordingly, the legal factfinding process
is quite aptly described as "a social invention for deciding between disputed
alternatives under conditions of uncertainty. 
' 5
But the legal system is not alone in its interest in "alternatives under
conditions of uncertainty": mathematics, through the subdiscipline of prob-
ability, has developed a coherent and intellectually powerful system for
addressing this very subject. It was inevitable that the legal system would
confront the question whether mathematical conceptions correctly and help-
fully describe the kind of uncertainty that exists in legal factfinding processes.
The legal system began to confront that question in earnest about twenty
years ago, continues to address it on a daily basis today, and will undoubtedly
be called upon to deal with it in the foreseeable future. The question is
persistent because statistical data from which probabilities can be generated
is available on an ever-increasing number of issues in our technological
society. And the question is a monumental one for the law because if the
law concedes that mathematical concepts correctly describe legal uncertainty,
then two conclusions seem to follow: first, that the burdens of persuasion
are amenable to mathematical expression; and second, that mathematical
evidence is an acceptable and perhaps even preferred mode of proof.
Not surprisingly, this monumental question has generated a large body
of case law and legal scholarship. Unfortunately, the legal scholarship has
consisted mainly of articles written by mathematical sophisticates, and much
of the work is impenetrable6 to many law students, evidence professors,
lawyers, and judges, who are by nature and training nonmathematically
inclined. Yet the issue is so fundamental and timely that the nomnathemat-
ically inclined person involved or interested in the legal system should have
some accessible entree into the debate, Thus, the goal of this article is to
explain in terms understandable to the nonmathematically inclined those
issues raised by the intersection of legal proof and mathematics, the argu-
ments on both sides of each issue from a theoretical perspective, how those
issues and arguments have been dealt with in the case law, and what valuable
insights social scientists have to offer. Although the article does not advocate
a particular resolution of most of the major theoretical issues (the field is
already rife with competing theories), the author hopes that a thorough yet
understandable explanation of the area will be helpful to those "in the
trenches. ' 7 The article is limited to a discussion of the issues as they arise
5. Saks & Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics,
15 L. & Soc'y REv. 123, 123 (1980-81).
6. At least they are "impenetrable" given the amount of time and energy that most
lawyers and judges have to devote to the task. That they are not totally impenetrable to the
non-mathematically inclined is evidenced by this Article, whose author falls squarely into that
category.
7. This is not the first such attempt, but should still be helpful. The earliest piece along
these lines, Broun & Kelly, Playing the Percentages and the Law of Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. L.
REv. 23, was published before most of the pertinent case opinions and scholarship came into
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in criminal cases, where the stakes are the highest. Much of the discussion,
however, is equally applicable to civil cases.
The article attempts to accomplish these goals in four parts. Part I
provides some basic building blocks necessary to initially understand the
topic. In Part II, the article re-examines the landmark mathematical evidence
case, People v. Collins,8 which must be understood completely because it
marks the real beginning of the intersection between the law and mathematics,
and because it continues to be considered by evidence texts, courts, and
scholars as the preeminent case on the subject. Next, in Part III, the article
gives an overview of the development of scholarship and case law since
Collins. The article culminates in Part IV by analyzing the five kinds of
mathematical evidence that arise in criminal cases and applying the schol-
arship, case law, and social science research which address their appropri-
ateness as proof.
I. THE BASIC BUILDING BLOCKS
A. The Mathematical Toolkit
Happily for the nonmathematically inclined, the basic toolkit necessary
for understanding mathematical issues in the proof process consists of only
six items: the relationships among "data," "statistics," and "probability;"
three theories of probability-classical, frequency and subjective; and two
mathematical rules, the product rule for independent events and Bayes'
Theorem. More happily, the relationships among "data," "statistics," and
"probability," the three theories of probability, and the product rule for
independent events are quite commonsensical and easily understandable. Even
Bayes' Theorem, while embodied in a mathematically imposing equation, is
simple to understand in principle.
Let us begin by examining the relationships among "data," "statistics,"
and "probability." "Data" are simply observations about the world.9 "Sta-
tistics" are numerically presented summaries of data conveying information
regarding the chosen subject.' 0 A "probability" is a calculation of the
mathematical likelihood of some statement about the world being true, where
existence. The next such effort, Braun, Quantitative Analysis and the Law: Probability Theory
as a Tool of Evidence in Criminal Trials, 1982 UTAH L. REv. 41, is helpful in explaining
theories of probability and their applications, but is not comprehensive in its coverage of case
law and scholarship. The succeeding article, Jaffee, Of Probativity and Probability: Statistics,
Scientific Evidence, and the Calculus of Chance at Trial, 46 U. Prrr. L. REv. 925 (1985),
includes a great deal of thought-provoking analysis, but is a book-length, mathematically
complex treatment. Finally, Kaye, The Admissibility of "Probability Evidence" in Criminal
Trials-Part II, 27 JuRwn-nucs J. 160 (1987), while providing numerous incisive concepts, again
is not comprehensive in its coverage of case law and scholarship. None of these pieces
incorporates social science research.
8. 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968).
9. WEnsMR's NEw WoRLD DicnO ARY 374 (College ed. 1968).
10. Id. at 1425.
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it is unknown whether that statement is true." The relationships among these
three concepts have four important aspects. First, neither statistics nor
probabilities can be formed without data. Second, probabilities are often
based on statistics, e.g., one can form a probability based on the statistic
that a certain die has rolled a "6" twenty times in 100 throws. Third,
probabilities can be based on data that is not numerical (and thus not
statistical) in nature: e.g., one may believe that, based on events, there is a
forty percent probability that the democracy movement will prevail in China
by the year 2000. Hereinafter in this article, probabilities based on statistical
data will be referred to as "statistically-based probabilities," while those not
based on statistical data will be referred to as "non-statistically-based prob-
abilities." Fourth, while a statistic may be used to form a probability, it
need not be so used. 2 A simple example will illustrate this point. Suppose
that a population of 100 persons is given blood tests, and it is determined
that only two of them have factor X in his or her blood. The statement,
"One-fiftieth of this population has factor X in his or her blood," is a
statistic. It has validity, and may be helpful in a criminal case, without ever
being made part of a probability calculation. For example, suppose that a
crime has been committed, the previously mentioned 100 people are the only
possible suspects, and blood left by the perpetrator at the scene is found to
contain factor X. As a matter of statistics, we can say, "Ninety-eight percent
of the suspect population could not have left such a blood trace." This is
not a probability because it does not concern the likelihood of any given
person's having committed the crime. It speaks in terms of certitude, not
likelihood: "Only two percent of the population could have left such a trace;
the other ninety-eight percent could not have."
There is a more subtle relationship between statistics and probability
that is disguised by the somewhat unreal example set forth in the preceding
paragraph, where the entire universe at issue was known and tested. In most
real-world situations, the entire universe is unknown-instead, only some
portion ("sample") of the universe is known and tested. The question then
becomes: To what extent can the statistical data derived from the sample be
extrapolated as fairly representative of the occurrence of the sampled char-
acteristic in some larger segment of the universe (the "population parame-
ter")? Obviously, it must be acknowledged that there is some possibility that
the statistics derived from the sample do not accurately reflect the occurrence
of the sampled characteristic in the population parameter because the pos-
sibility always exists that the sample is not representative of the population
parameter. Statisticians have developed sophisticated techniques to estimate
the likelihood that the statistics derived from the sample do not accurately
reflect the occurrence of the sampled characteristic throughout the population
parameter. One common sense principle is fundamental, though: the larger
11. Id. at 1160.
12. Special thanks go to Professors Kaye and Klugman for illuminating these distinctions
for the author.
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the sample, the less likelihood of error. For example, in a population of
one million suspects the statistic derived from testing 100 individuals for the
presence of blood factor X obviously has a greater probability of error when
extrapolated over the entire population than a statistic derived from testing
10,000 individuals. In either case, the statement, "Two percent of the suspect
population has blood factor X," is implicitly based on a probability calcu-
lation that the rate of occurrence in the sampled segment continues to occur
proportionately in the unsampled segment. Any statistical statement based
upon less than full testing, then, does make a probabilistic statement about
the world: there is a probability that this proportion continues throughout
the universe at issue. But, importantly, in the criminal law context this
implicit statistical probability that the statistic is accurate does not make a
statement regarding a probability related to guilt of any suspect. The statistic
simply has a simultaneous inclusive and eliminative effect on whether the
defendant is within the class of possible culprits, e.g., "The defendant has
blood factor X, which we believe only two percent of the population has,
based upon sampling of the population with the results of the sample
extrapolated to continue over the whole population." Once we know there
are 100 people in the entire population, and the additional non-statistical
information that factor X blood was left by the perpetrator, and that two
percent of the population has factor X blood, we can calculate probabilities
relating to random selections of blood factor X carriers (one in fifty of
selecting a person with factor X blood; one in two of selecting the culprit
from between the two carriers of factor X blood). The distinction between
statistics and probability is absolutely fundamental in understanding both
the scholarly literature and the case law.
The next necessary explanation concerns the three theories of probabil-
ity. 3 The classical theory was the first to be developed. The theory grew
out of a study of gambling and game problems that began in the mid-
seventeenth century. 4 This theory calculates probability based on the number
of possible outcomes. For example, the probability of rolling a "6" with a
fair die under this theory is one-sixth since there are six possible outcomes.
The classical theory is quite limited in application because its results are
rationally acceptable only when one is willing to assume that each of the
possible outcomes is equally likely. In non-game-like real-world situations,
13. For a discussion of the classical, frequency, and subjective theories, see Braun, supra
note 7, at 45-55; Cullison, Probability Analysis of Judicial Fact-finding: A Preliminary Outline
of the Subjective Approach, I U. ToL. L. REv. 538, 545-59 (1969). More elaborate taxonomies
of probability theories are available, but are unnecessary and unhelpful for purposes of this
Article because the classical, frequency, and subjective theories are the ones that arise in practice.
See J. Wsmoa, IA WIOMORE ON EvIDENcE 37.6 n.5 (P. Tillers ed. 1983) (noting that "any
division of probability theory into types is not without its difficulties" and going on to discuss
several proposed taxononies). See also Kaye, What Is Bayesianism? A Guide For The Perplexed,
28 Jutn&saacs J. 161, 164-67 (1988) (identifying seven types of probability).
14. See Cullison, supra note 13, at 545-46. This theory is also known as the "a priori"
and is usually identified with LaPlace. Id. at 546.
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where outcomes are very rarely equally likely, the classical theory does not
lead to rationally acceptable results. For example, a purely classical approach
to the question, "What is the probability that the high temperature will be
over eighty degrees in Des Moines, Iowa, next January 1?," would be fifty
percent since there are only two possible outcomes-eighty degrees or less
and over eighty degrees. Of course, one could get more elaborate. Assuming
the hottest it ever gets in Des Moines is 110 degrees, and the coldest is thirty
degrees below zero, there are 141 possible temperatures, and the classical
theory would calculate the probability of the temperature exceeding eighty
degrees to be thirty out of 140 (there are thirty possibilities over eighty
degrees, and 111 below it). Either way, real-world experience tells us that
the probability calculation is way off-there is practically no chance of such
a temperature in Des Moines on that date.
The limited number of possible applications of the classical theory led
to the development of the frequency theory of probability in the last half
of the nineteenth century. 5 The frequency model bases its predictions on
the relative frequency with which particular outcomes are expected to result
from repeated trials. 16 The statistical information needed to calculate this
relative frequency can be obtained by counting within a known sample (e.g.,
sixty of the 100 marbles in this bag are black and forty are red) or by
repeated tests of an unknown sample (e.g., out of 100 draws from this bag
which contains an unknown proportion of black and red marbles, I drew
black sixty times). Either derivation of the statistics leads to the same
frequency probability: over a long number of draws the probability is that
black will be drawn three-fifths of the time. Note, however, that in the real
world of criminal cases the sample is never specifically known, and thus the
second derivation of the statistic-sampling of the population-is the only
way a valid statistic can be generated. The obvious advantage of the frequency
theory over the classical theory is that it can be applied to real-world
situations where the possible outcomes are not equally likely. Of course,
when the possible outcomes are equally likely, the classical and frequency
theories result in the same probability: the probability under either theory
of a fair die rolling a "6" is one-sixth.
The third probability theory-the subjective model-had its origins in
the work of James Bernoulli in the early eighteenth century, 17 and was
popularized by an influential work published by Professor Leonard Savage
in 1950.18 Savage demonstrated that given a few simple and relatively
noncontroversial assumptions, a probability subjectively developed by an
individual can still meaningfully be called a "probability." Such a probability
can, if so desired, be used as a meaningful input into Bayes' Theorem.
15. Cullison, supra note 13, at 548.
16. Brilnayer & Kornhauser, Review: Quantitative Methods and Legal Decisions, 46 U.
Cm. L. REv. 116, 138 (1978).
17. See J. BERoutLu, ARs CO NECTANDI (1713).
18. L. SAVAGE, FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS (1950). The subjective theory is also known
as the "personalistic" theory.
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Subjective probability theory is obviously the only one of the three theories
of probability that can accommodate purely non-statistically-based probabil-
ities, such as the probability that the democracy movement in China will
triumph before the year 2000.
Let us now turn to the two mathematical rules necessary to complete
the toolkit. The product rule for independent events (hereinafter "the product
rule") is used in calculating the probability of two or more independent
events occurring together, and simply states that the probability of the
occurrence of both is the product of the probabilities of each, i.e., the
individual probabilities are simply multiplied together. It can also be used
to figure a statistic regarding the coincidence of two or more independent
characteristics. Events or characteristics are "independent" when the inci-
dence of occurrence of one is neither increased nor decreased by the
occurrence of any of the others.19 For example, suppose that the question is
"What is the probability that a randomly chosen person from the adult
population of the United States will be a lefthanded woman?" Suppose that
frequency data shows that one-half of the.adult population are women, and
one-tenth of adults are lefthanded. Since handedness is not a function of
gender, i.e., a woman is no more likely to be lefthanded than a man, the
two characteristics would be independent. Thus, the product rule for inde-
pendent events would tell us that there is a one-twentieth chance of randomly
selecting a lefthanded woman. But suppose the question is, "What is the
probability that a randomly chosen person from the adult population of the
United States will be a woman lawyer?" Assume that the frequency data
shows that one-half the adult population are women, and one-two-hundredth
are lawyers. We might initially be tempted to use the product rule for
independent events to calculate a probability of one-four-hundredth. But this
would be wrong because we know that the two characteristics are not
independent: if a chosen person is a woman, she is much less likely to be a
lawyer than a person who is a man. Accordingly, another equation must be
used to account for this situation. There is a relatively simple formula for
calculating the probability of all of two or more mutually dependent events
occurring. This formula multiplies the probability of the first event's occur-
ring times the probability of the second event's occurring, where it is known
that the first event occurs." But this formula is rarely, if ever, used in cases
or discussed by commentators. Instead, a mathematically complex formula
known as Bayes' Theorem, which provides more information than the
product rule for mutually dependent events, sometimes shows up in case
law, and has often been the focus of commentators.
2
19. See Cullison, supra note 13, at 541-42.
20. In mathematical notation the formulation is written P(A + 13) = P(A) x P(B/A),
where P(A + B) represents the probability of the occurrence of both the first event (A) and
the second event (B), P(A) represents the probability of the first event (A), and P(B/A)
represents the frequency with which the second event (B) occurs out of all the cases in which
the first event (A) occurs. Cullison, supra note 13, at 541-42.
21. For a derivation of Bayes' Theorem from the product rule for mutually dependent
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Bayes' Theorem" is legally significant because it offers a means by which
a probability estimate concerning a matter at issue can be revised in light of
a new piece of probabilistic evidence,2 i.e., how a "prior probability" can
be revised in light of new data to reach a "posterior probability." Suppose
that a person has been selected at random from the adult population of the
United States, and the question is what is the probability that this person is
a lawyer. Suppose our "prior probability," based upon the proportion of
lawyers in the population, is one-two-hundredth. Suppose we now learn that
the person selected is a woman, and evidence is introduced that only one-
fifteenth of all lawyers are women. How do we revise our "prior probability"
of one-two-hundredth in light of this new evidence? Bayes' Theorem tells
us: the "posterior" probability is 1/1500.24 This illustration uses a frequency
theory-derived figure for the prior probability, a frequency theory-derived
figure for the new evidence, and results in a frequency theory posterior
probability. But the Theorem works equally well using a subjective theory-
derived figure for one of the inputs. For example, suppose that a defendant
is charged with murder and, based upon the evidence thus far presented,
the jury believes that there is a fifty percent likelihood that he is guilty. This
is a subjective probability figure. Suppose further that the prosecution
introduces new evidence of a palm print on a knife left at the murder scene,
accompanied by expert testimony that the defendant's palm print is consistent
events, see Cullison, supra note 13, at 544-45. The "more" provided by Bayes' Theorem is that
it permits the calculation of P(A/B), not merely P(A + B).
22. There are various ways to write Bayes' Theorem. A simple formulation is as follows:
P(A/B) = P(B/A) x P(A)
P(B)
Where P(A/B) represents the frequency with which A occurs out of all cases in which B occurs
(the "posterior probability"); P(B/A) represents the frequency with which B occurs out of all
cases in which A occurs; P(B) represents the probability of B occurring; and P(A) represents
the probability of A occurring (the "prior probability").
A more complicated and more often used version is as follows:
P(A/B) = P(B/A) x P(A)
P(A)P(B/A)+P(not A) P(B/not A)
The only new terms here are P(not-A), which represents the probability of A's non-occurrence;
and P(B/not-A), which represents the frequency with which B occurs out of all the cases in
which A does not occur.
23. Finkelstein & Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 HAuv. L.
Rav. 489, 502 (1970).
24. Using the simple formulation of Bayes' Theorem from note 22, the calculation is as
follows: P(L/W) stands for the probability that the person is a lawyer given that she is a
woman; P(W/L) stands for the probability that the person is a woman given that she is a
lawyer; P(L) stands for the probability that the person is a lawyer; and P(W) stands for the
probability that the person is a woman. Solving the equation to determine P(L/W) = 1/15 x
1/200 - 1/2 = 1/1500.
It should be noted that while nobody doubts the validity of Bayes' Theorem from a
mathematical standpoint, statisticians are as divided as legal scholars on the question whether
Bayes' Theorem is an appropriate device with which to manipulate real-world statistical data.
748
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with the palm print on the knife, and that only about one of every 1000
people in the population could leave such a print. This is a frequency
probability figure. By applying Bayes' Theorem, the jurors' fifty percent
prior probability estimate of guilt should be adjusted because of the new
probabilistic evidence up to a 99.9 percent posterior probability? Here, the
Theorem has combined a subjectively-derived prior probability with a fre-
quency-derived new piece of evidence to arrive at a subjective posterior
probability. The Theorem can accommodate any combination of subjective
or frequency-derived inputs as the prior or new-evidence probabilities, but
it is important to remember that if either the prior probability or the new
evidence figures are subjectively-derived, then the posterior probability will
be subjective.
With this simple mathematical toolkit the reader has the equipment
necessary to understand the mathematics of virtually every reported criminal
case involving mathematical evidence and every scholarly writing on the
subject. The reader cannot understand the possible legal ramifications of the
applications of these tools to the proof process, however, without clearly
understanding the basic contentions between the two competing schools of
thought.
B. The Mathematical Probabilist and Anti-Mathematical Probabilist
Positions
Those who favor the use of probabilities in the proof process (hereinafter
"mathematical probabilists" or "probabilists") and those who oppose the
use of probabilities (hereinafter "anti-mathematical probabilists" or "anti-
probabilists") have fundamental disagreements. 26 While both camps agree
25. This example is a famous one originated by Finkelstein & Farley, supra note 23, at
496-501. If the reader is disconcerted by the concept of the jury forming a belief in the
likelihood of guilt before all of the evidence has been presented, the reader is not alone. Indeed,
this has been one of the most hotly debated topics concerning the application of Bayes' Theorem
to criminal cases, and will be discussed infra in the text accompanying notes-285-88.
26. Not everyone involved in the debate, of course, falls strictly into one camp or the
other. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 38-41 for a difference of opinion within the
probabilist camp between the "utilitarian" probabilists and other probabilists. Some scholars
see these schools of thought as not so much in conflict as simply speaking to different aspects
of the proof process. See, e.g., Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U.L. Rnv.
401 (1986); Schum, Probability and the Processes of Discovery, Proof, and Choice, 66 B.U.L.
Ra,. 825 (1986) (a particularly good introduction to the whole mathematical evidence debate);
Tillers, Mapping Inferential Domains, 66 B.U.L. Ray. 883 (1986). Perhaps not surprisingly the
most avid probabilists are not lawyers, but rather persons like Professor Stephen Fienberg,
Professor of Statistics and Social Science at Carnegie Mellon University, and Professor Mark
Schervish, Professor of Social and Decision Sciences at Carnegie Mellon University. See Fienberg
& Schervish, The Relevance of Bayesian Inference for the Presentation of Statistical Evidence
and for Legal Decision-Making, 66 B.U.L. Rv. 771 (1986), probably the most pro-probabilist
writing to be found in the literature. At the other end of the spectrum, seemingly the most
vehement anti-probabilist is Professor Leonard Jaffee. See Jaffee, Prior Probability-A Black
Hole in the Mathematician's View of the Sufficiency and Weight of Evidence, 9 CARnozo L.
Ra,. 967 (1988); Jaffee, supra note 7, at 925.
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on the starting point-that absolute truth regarding a past event can never
be known, and thus that the judicial system can only strive to decide, in the
words of Justice Harlan, "what probably happened," 27-the camps split
regarding what "probably" means in the context of the proof process. There
are two main points of contention, with opposing positions on each conten-
tion having a momentous impact on what the camps view as the value of
the elements of the mathematical toolkit to the proof process, or the meaning
of the burden of persuasion.
1. The First Point of Contention-Is All Evidence Inherently
Probabilistic?
The first point of contention is as follows. Probabilists, believing that
the legal proof process can be described in the language of mathematical
probability, believe that all evidence is in essence probabilistic. They argue
that, because every item of evidence is inherently less than absolutely true,
each item's evidentiary value can be expressed in terms of the subjective
probability of its being true. This leads to the further conclusion that the
line of reasoning from proof to conclusion is subjectively probabilistic as
well. 28 Anti-probabilists respond that all evidence is not inherently probabi-
listic and that the reasoning from proof to conclusion in the trial process is
not subjectively probabilistic. 29 Rather, each piece of evidence goes some
distance, depending on its weight, toward establishing or refuting one party's
explanation or some alternative to it:
This sort of [probabilistic] analysis, however, misconstrues how juries
reason when they consider "particularistic" evidence such as witness
testimony. Their actual reasoning is quite different from the sort of
statistical reasoning espoused by the probabilists, and thus under-
mines the claim that all evidence is ultimately statistical.
There are numerous forms of inductive inference in addition to
statistical syllogisms. The type that most accurately characterizes how
the jury reasons when it considers "particularistic" evidence is
inference to the best explanation .... With inference to the best
explanation, the jury considers alternative hypotheses that would
explain the available evidence, and chooses the most plausible ex-
planation.30
27. See supra text accompanying note 3.
28. See, e.g., Ball, The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of Proof,
14 VA-D. L. REv. 807, 812-13 (1961); Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1021,
1023 (1977); Saks & Kidd, supra note 5, at 151-53; Williams, A Short Rejoinder, 1980 Csw.
L. REv. 103, 103 [hereinafter Williams, Rejoinder]; Williams, The Mathematics of Proof-I,
1979 CGuM. L. REv. 297, 299-300.
29. See, e.g., Callen, Notes on a Grand Illusion: Some Limits on the Use of Bayesian
Theory in Evidence Law, 57 IND. L.J. 1, 16-17 (1982); Jaffee, supra note 7, at 1017.
30. Note, Gambling on the Truth: The Use of Purely Statistical Evidence as a Basis for
Civil Liability, 22 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 31, 53 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Gambling on
the Truth].
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This aspect of the debate between the camps is persistent and pervasive.
The ramifications of each camp's positions on this point to their views
of the value of the items in the mathematical toolkit is straightforward.
Regarding data, statistics, and probabilities, mathematical probabilists, be-
lieving as they do that all evidence is ultimately probabilistic, are firm
believers not only in the use of empirically sampled data, empirical statistics,
and empirical probabilities, but also in the use of non-empirically sampled
data to form non-empirical probabilities. As to the theories of probability,
probabilists recognize that neither the classical nor frequency theories alone
serve their purpose of assigning a probability to the defendant's guilt. The
classical theory alone is unsuitable because in the real world the assumption
of equal probability of results is almost always unjustified. The frequency
theory alone is inappropriate because it speaks only to expected results over
repeated trials. Only subjective probability can be used to legitimately form
a probability with respect to a unique past event such as whether the
defendant committed the crime.31 Subjective probabilities are appropriate,
argue the mathematical probabilists, because they are the mathematical way
of stating beliefs. Regarding the two rules in the mathematical toolkit,
probabilists recognize that the product rule is helpful in manipulating statistics
and in forming classical or frequency probabilities where the statistics are
mutually independent. The product rule is recognized by probabilists to be
inappropriate, however, in the formation of most subjective probabilities
where the inputs, which are usually quite varied (e.g., the probability
regarding the truth of eyewitness testimony, the probability of truth of proof
of motive, and the probability of truth of blood factor analysis) cannot be
shown to be mutually independent. Mathematical probabilists instead are
enamored of Bayes' Theorem for use with their subjective probabilities
because it can be used to meld different varieties of evidence without requiring
that they be mutually independent.
32
As to the anti-probabilist position, regarding data, statistics, and prob-
abilities, the one point on which they agree with the probabilists is with
respect to the use of empirically sampled data and empirical statistics. As
long as such data and statistics are used only to eliminate possible suspects
and are not used to form probabilities, the logic of the anti-probabilist
position supports the use of such empirical results because they help to
31. M. FInKEiSTIN, QUANTITATIV METHODS N LAW: STuDis iN THE APPLICATION oF
MATHEIicAL. PROBABIIIY AND STATISTICS TO LEGAL PROBLEMS 62-65 (1978); Kaye, The Laws
of Probability and the Law of the Land, 47 U. Cm. L. REv. 34, 41-47 (1979); Tribe, Trial by
Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HALv. L. REv. 1329, 1348 (1971);
Note, Gambling on the Truth, supra note 30, at 38.
32. See, e.g., Kaye, Paradoxes, Gedanken Experiments and the Burden of Proof. A
Response To Dr. Cohen's Reply, 1981 ARiz. ST. L.J. 635, 638-39; Lempert, supra note 28, at
1023. One commentator who attended the Boston University Symposium on probabilities in the
proof process concluded that "Bayesian Theory is indeed an orthodoxy [among evidence law
scholars]". Edwards, Summing Up: The Society of Bayesian Trial Lawyers, 66 B.U.L. REv.
937 (1986).
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negate alternative explanations (i.e., the guilt of someone other than the
defendant) inconsistent with the guilt of the defendant. 3  Anti-probabilists
denounce the use of non-empirically sampled data to form non-empirical
probabilities, however, because anti-probabilists deny that all evidence is
inherently probabilistic, and that the reasoning process from proof to con-
clusion is subjectively probabilistic.3 4 With respect to the theories of proba-
bility, anti-probabilists reject the use of probabilities based upon the classical
and frequency theories for the same reasons that probabilists recognize that
they cannot rely solely on such probabilities-the classical theory is usually
inappropriate in real-world situations where outcomes are not equally likely,
and the frequency theory speaks only to expected results over repeated
trials. 35 Anti-probabilists deny that subjective probability is appropriate in
the proof process because the only belief it leads to is a belief in what might
have happened, a legally insignificant matter, since what the legal system
calls for is a belief in what actually happened.36 With respect to the two
rules in the toolkit, anti-probabilists do not deny that the product rule can
properly be used to calculate a combined statistical occurrence where the
underlying statistics are mutually independent. Anti-probabilists do, however,
vigorously oppose the use of Bayes' Theorem for several reasons, the most
fundamental of which is that multiplication is inappropriate as applied to
the proof process where mutually independent pieces of evidence and infer-
ences are involved. To anti-probabilists each piece of evidence and each
inference is ultimately an all-or-nothing proposition. Either the jury believes
the evidence or inference (because it is the most plausible alternative) or
does not believe it (because it is not the most plausible alternative). If the
jury believes the evidence or inference, it can then proceed to examine the
truth of other items dependent upon it, whereas if the jury does not believe
the evidence or inference, the reasoning chain stops.
37
2. The Second Point of Contention-Do Mathematical Probabilist
Concepts Describe the Optimal Operation of the Trial Process as It
Operates Through the Burden of Persuasion?
Some probabilists limit their justification of the value of mathematical
probability concepts in the proof process to that set forth with respect to
the first point of contention outlined above: mathematical probability con-
cepts correctly and helpfully describe the nature and weight of evidence, and
33. Telephone Conversation with Professor Richard Wright, Associate Professor of Law,
ITT Chicago-Kent School of Law (Feb. 1990).
34. See supra note 29 and authorities cited therein.
35. See, e.g., Note, Gambling on the Truth, supra note 30, at 38.
36. Jaffee, supra note 7, at 934, 936; Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability,
Naked Statistics, and Proof. Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73 IowA
L. REv. 1001, 1054, 1060 (1988).
37. Cohen, The Logic Of Proof, 1980 Cans. L. Ray. 91, 93; Schum, supra note 26, at
857; Shafer, The Construction Of Probability Arguments, 66 B.U.L. Rav. 799, 803 (1986);
Wright, supra note 36, at 1061.
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the line of reasoning from evidence to conclusion.38 Other probabilists go
further, and argue that mathematical probability concepts describe the op-
timal operation of the trial process. This latter group, to whom we will refer
as "utilitarian probabilists," argues that an optimally operating legal system
will maximize the number of correct verdicts (i.e., verdicts that reflect what
actually happened) while minimizing the number of incorrect verdicts. 39 They
then contend that mathematical probability concepts exactly describe this
optimal operation: in a civil case a plaintiff should win if and only if the
plaintiff has proven that the probability that her proof warrants recovery is
greater than fifty percent;40 in a criminal case the prosecution should win if
and only if the prosecution has proven that the probability that its proof
warrants conviction is greater than whatever probability figure should be
assigned to the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard (a number which
even utilitarian probabilists hesitate to assign, but which is generally agreed
to lie somewhere above ninety percent, and is expressed merely as something
like "extremely probable. ' 41)
38. See, e.g., Kaye, supra note 31; Lempert, supra note 28.
39. See, e.g., Ball, supra note 28, at 816-817; Brook, The Use of Statistical Evidence of
Identification in Civil Litigation: Well-Worn Hypotheticals, Real Cases, and Controversy, 29
ST. Louis U.L.J. 293 (1985); Shaviro, Statistical-Probability Evidence and the Appearance of
Justice, 103 HARv. L. REv. 530, 532 (1989); Winter, The Jury and the Risk of Nonpersuasion,
5 L. & Soc'Y REV. 335, 337 (1971).
40. See, e.g., M. FiwEism N, supra note 31, at 65; Brook, supra note 39, at 296; Cohen,
Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of Imperfect Knowledge, 60
N.Y.U. L. REv. 385, 390-91 (1985) (this is Professor Neil Cohen, a probabilist, who is not to
be confused with Professor L. Jonathan Cohen, a vehement anti-probabilist); Eggleston, The
Probability Debate, 1980 CswM. L. REv. 678, 680; McBaine, Burden of Proof. Degrees of
Belief, 32 CAun. L. REv. 242, 246, 262 (1944).
41. The utilitarian probabilists have difficulty with the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard. See, e.g., Brook, supra note 39, at 309 ("[The goal of accuracy always has had to
contend with other factors in the criminal context."); Kaplan, Decision Theory and The
Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. Rav. 1065 (1968) ("Probably the most important reason why
we do not attempt to express reasonable doubt in terms of quantitative odds, however, is that
in any rational system of utilities (or disutilities) that determine the necessary probability of
guilt will vary with the crime for which the defendant is being tried, and indeed with the
particular defendant." Id. at 1073.); Tribe, supra note 31 (although Tribe is often viewed as
an anti-probabilist because he reached the conclusion that probabilistic evidence should not be
admissible in criminal cases, he reached that conclusion not because he disagreed with the
precepts of the probabilist position but instead because he believed the evidence was unfairly
prejudicial). Professor Daniel Shaviro is a utilitarian probabilist who is comfortable applying
the mathematical approach in the criminal context. Shaviro asserts that:
Perhaps the most obvious purpose of the trial system is to reach accurate verdicts-
for example, to convict criminal defendants when and only when they have committed
the unlawful acts of which they are accused. Apart from any practical benefits of
deciding cases accurately (such as improving deterrence), the accuracy of verdicts has
moral implications. Consider a criminal trial in which the defendant, accused of rape,
defends on the basis of consent, and the presence or absence of consent would be
unambiguous if all the facts were known. A false conviction will punish an innocent
man, perhaps severely, for a heinous crime. A false acquittal may cause the rape
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For anti-probabilists, the "probability" of finding liability in a civil case
or of finding guilt in a criminal case sufficient to meet the burden of
persuasion can only be arrived at by the process of eliminating alternative
explanations inconsistent with the guilt of the defendant.42 To look at the
long run of cases, they argue, results in callously sacrificing a certain
percentage of defendants who have not been proven to be culpable. 43 Only
if all plausible alternative explanations other than guilt have been negated
can the juror find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.44 Thus, according to the
anti-probabilists, the required juror mindset for conviction is not a subjective
probability that the defendant's guilt is "extremely probable," but rather,
"No explanation other than the defendant's guilt appearing plausible to me,
I actually believe that the defendant is guilty (even though I recognize the
possibility that I may be wrong)." In support of their position, anti-
probabilists can point to the fact that no jurisdiction phrases its burden of
persuasion in criminal cases in probabilistic terms, and in fact some courts
state that jurors must be convinced of the defendant's guilt "to a moral
certainty," which means "that the inference of guilt is the only one that
can fairly and reasonably be drawn from the facts, and that the evidence
excludes beyond a reasonable doubt every reasonable hypothesis of inno-
cence." 45
The difference between the utilitarian probabilist and anti-probabilist
positions with respect to the burden of persuasion is best demonstrated by
an illustration. We will use a variation on a well-known hypothetical proposed
victim unjust humiliation, in addition to other harms.
Sheviro, supra note 39, at 532; see also Kaye, supra note 31, at 40 ("Surely it is not some
defect in probability theory that restrains us from instructing jurors that they should convict so
long as they are, say, at least ninety-five percent certain that the defendant is guilty. A much
simpler explanation is that we would prefer not to advertise the fact that we are willing to
sacrifice one innocent person in order to secure the conviction of nineteen guilty ones.");
Williams, supra note 28, at 306-07 (arguing that while theoretically jurors should be instructed
on the degree of probability that the law counts as beyond a reasonable doubt, "[t]he answer,
[why they are not], I suppose, is that there is no consensus upon this probability, and that the
question is theoretical so long as we find it almost impossible to state forensic probability in
mathematical terms.").
42. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 36, at 1065; Note, Gambling on the Truth, supra note
30, at 49 (although this Note does not deal with criminal cases, it is, to the shame of all the
professional scholars who have written in this area, by far the most concise and understandable
explication of the debate between the two camps).
43. See, e.g., Callen, supra note 29, at 9.
44. Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 16, at 144; Callen, Second-Order Considerations,
Weight, Sufficiency and Schema Theory: A Comment on Professor Brilmayer's Theory, 66
B.U.L. REv. 715, 727 (1986); Cohen, The Role of Evidential Weight in Criminal Proof, 66
B.U.L. REv. 635, 648 (1986); Cohen, supra note 37, at 91-92; Jaffee, supra note 26, at 1001;
Jaffee, supra note 7, at 939, 947, 1045; Note, Gambling on the Truth, supra note 30, at 45.
45. People v. Johnson, 140 A.D.2d 626, 528 N.Y.S.2d 666 (1988); see also People v.
Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 332, 438 P.2d 33, 41, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497, 505 (1968) ("In essence this
argument of the prosecutor was calculated to persuade the jury to convict defendants whether
or not they were convinced of their guilt to a moral certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt.").
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by Professor Nesson: the prison guard murder.46 Suppose it is known that
ninety-nine of 100 prisoners in an enclosed yard collaborated in the murder
of a prison guard while the one hundredth prisoner did not collaborate or
participate. Suppose that one of the 100 prisoners is picked at random to
be tried for the murder. No evidence is presented other than the statistical
information. If this imposing statistic-ninety-nine of 100 are guilty-would
be sufficient for a utilitarian probabilist to form a subjective belief that it
is "extremely probable" that the defendant is guilty (whether a utilitarian
probabilist would find this statistic to be sufficient to create such a subjective
probability is discussed in the next paragraph), the utilitarian probabilist
would hold the evidence sufficient for conviction. If each of the 100 possible
defendants were tried, the utilitarian probabilist would argue that each should
be convicted despite our certain knowledge that this would result in one
false conviction. 47 An anti-probabilist, on the other hand, would argue that
a directed verdict would be in order for each and every one of the 100
defendants, since as to each there is a distinct possibility of non-guilt that
has not been negated by the prosecution.
Utilitarian probabilists sometimes try to soften the mechanistic nature
of their position by arguing that a high probability based on the classical or
frequency theories does not necessarily translate into a sufficient subjective
probability to support a finding of guilt. They argue that the very absence
of other evidence which could have been presented by the prosecution may
prevent the formation of a subjective probability sufficient to support a
finding of guilt.49 Anti-probabilists contend that this attempt by the utilitarian
probabilists to ameliorate their position to eliminate its most obvious objec-
46. This hypothetical (using the figure that twenty-four of twenty-five were guilty) was
developed by Professor Charles Nesson in Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences:
The Value of Complexity, 92 HARv. L. Rav. 1187, 1192-93 (1979). In the civil context the two
famous hypotheticals are the rodeo gatecrasher developed by Professor L. Jonathan Cohen, in
THE PROBABLE AND THE PRovABLE 75 (1977), and the Blue Bus case created by Professor
Laurence Tribe in Tribe, supra note 31, at 1340-41.
47. C. ALLEN, LEGAL Dutias AND OrnR ESSAYS I JUIusPRUDENCE 286-87 (ed. 1977):
I dare say some sentimentalists would assent to the proposition that it is better that
a thousand, or even a million, guilty persons should escape than that one innocent
person should suffer; but no sensible and practical person would accept such a view.
For it is obvious that if our ratio is extended indefinitely, there comes a point when
the whole system of justice has broken down and society is in a state of chaos. In
short, it is only when there is a reasonable and uniform probability of guilty persons
being detected and convicted that we can allow humane doubt to prevail over security.
Id.
48. Professor Glanville Williams, who is a probabilist on most points, cannot bring himself
to make the final step to probabilizing the burden of persuasion. Williams states "The true
reason why the proof fails in the gatecrasher case and the Blue Bus case is that it does not
sufficiently mark out the defendant from others. No doubt, we are illogical in this." Williams,
supra note 28, at 305. In a later continuation of this thought Williams acknowledges that even
in a civil case a mathematical probability of 999 out of 1000 of liability would not be sufficient
to support a verdict for the plaintiff. Williams, Rejoinder, supra note 28, at 106.
49. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 40, at 399; Kaye, The Paradox of the Gatecrasher and
Other Stories, 1979 ARiz. ST. L.J. 101, 106; Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing
the Process of Proof, 66 B.U.L. REy. 439, 457 (1986).
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tionable aspect is unconvincing. ° Professor Wright has summarized the anti-
probabilist position in the context of another well-known hypothetical put
forth by L. Jonathan Cohen-the rodeo gatecrasher (501 of 1000 spectators
are known to have snuck into a rodeo without paying):
This [probabilist] response clearly is inadequate. First, it does not
explain why the jury is not even allowed to consider the naked
statistics, rather than being allowed to consider and possibly discount
the statistics. Second, it does not explain why the plaintiff, rather
than the defendant, is being charged with failure to supply other
types of evidence. Third, it at least implicitly admits that other types
of evidence are more probative than naked statistics; otherwise why
insist on more than the naked statistics? Fourth, it falls to explain
why there is no liability even when the objective probability is much
higher than fifty percent-for example when only fifty of the 1000
spectators paid for their tickets. In this situation, even when the
objective ninety-five percent probability is discounted, the subjective
probability almost certainly is greater than fifty percent. Fifth, it
fails to address the hypothetical as Cohen presented it, which assumes
that no other evidence is available.
5 '
The debate regarding the burden of persuasion 52 perhaps consumes more
pages in the scholarly debate than any other single aspect of the war between
the probabilists and anti-probabilists 53 (with the applicability of Bayes' The-
orem to the proof process running neck-and-neck). 54
3. Ramifications for Relevance
Although probabilists usually take the relevance of statistics and prob-
abilities for granted and focus instead on the burden of persuasion issue and
the applicability of Bayes' Theorem, in fact one of the stronger arrows in
the quiver of the probabilists is the language of the modern rule of relevance:
"having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
... more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."
'55
50. See, e.g., Brilmayer, Second-Order Evidence and Bayesian Logic, 66 B.U.L. REv.
673, 676-77 (1986).
51. Wright, supra note 36, at 1055-56.
52. Special thanks go to Professor Kaye for his help in sorting out the camps in this
debate (which is not to say that the author has ended up with an explanation in which Professor
Kaye completely concurs).
53. The war shows no signs of abating: "The whole topic remains fascinating, and despite
the amount of ink that has been spilled, I fear that more remains to be said." Letter from
Professor Kaye to David McCord (May 15, 1990).
54. The author should disclose that he finds the anti-probabilist position to be correct
because he finds convincing the anti-probabilist positions with respect to the definition of
relevance and to how the burden of persuasion is met.
55. FED. R. Evo. 401 (emphasis added). Green, Foreward, 66 B.U.L. Rv. 377, 377
(1986).
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On the infrequent occasion when probabilists do address relevance they
simply point to the language of this rule.5 6
Anti-probabilists argue that the material issue in any case is what actually
happened and that, thus, probabilities are irrelevant because they speak only
to the immaterial issue of what might have happened.5 7 Anti-probabilists
argue that the word "probable" in the modern definition of relevance does
not refer to mathematical concepts of probability:
Too, "probable" can mean "worthy of being believed true" as well
as it can mean "likely." So, evidence that tends to make a fact
"probable" is "evidence that affords ground for belief." Whether
a particular "fact" is worthy of being believed true, then, depends
upon whether the items evidencing it are, collectively, worthy of
being believed to "add up" to the "fact.". . . "Probative" not only
does not mean "statistically significant;" it means, as a term of art
in Evidence Law, "capable in logic and experience of proving.
' 5 s
Thus, while the modem rule of relevance does indeed speak in terms of
making "probable," the anti-probabilists argue that term is not meant in a
mathematical sense.
56. See, e.g., Brook, supra note 39, at 321; Friedman, A Close Look at Probative Value,
66 B.U.L. Ray. 733, 734-35 (1986); Lempert, supra note 28, at 1025-26.
Sometimes probabilists get carried away with their argument however. L. Jonathan Cohen
posed a hypothetical in which the issue was whether a man was likely to survive to age seventy
and evidence was offered that men with six letter names had a higher survival rate to that age
than other men. Cohen concluded that the evidence would not be relevant because there was
no causal connection between the number of letters in a name and the age to which a person
would survive. Cohen, Subjective Probability and the Paradox of the Gatecrasher, 1981 Apiz.
ST. L.J. 627, 633. For the probabilists, Professor Kaye argued "[W]ere we actually confronted
with a finite population in which substantially more men with six letter names became
septigenerians, then the evidence would be relevant .... [T]here is no legal requirement of causal
as opposed to purely statistical association." Kaye, supra note 32, at 639, 640. Kaye was taken
to task for this assertion by Professor Jaffee in Jaffee, supra note 7, at 1021. The anti-
probabilists clearly have the better of this argument since one cannot imagine a court admitting
statistical evidence that was obviously a product of pure happenstance. Professor Kaye refuses
to budge on this point, however:
I can imagine a court admitting statistical evidence that was obviously a product of
pure happenstance. A murder by stabbing occurs on a yacht with 10 people on board.
Seven are female and six of them have blond hair. A person on a fishing boat in
the area says that she saw a blond woman toss a knife overboard. Are you really so
sure that the court would sustain an objection to proof by the woman so identified
that five other women on board have blond hair? Or would you argue that hair color
is causally relevant (unlike some "antiprobabilists") or that the number of women is
not a statistic? Or suppose that all passengers were killed instantly in a plane crash.
Quite by happenstance, all those with long names were more than 50 years old, and
everyone with short names was less than 50 years old. For some good reason, the
information that permitted this to be determined directly is no longer available, and
it is important to decide whether a passenger lived more than 50 years. Why are you
so sure that the name length-a matter of pure happenstance-would be inadmissible?
Letter from Professor Kaye to David McCord (May 15, 1990).
57. See supra text accompanying note 36.
58. Jaffee, supra note 7, at 1059.
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So far we have examined the mathematical toolkit, and the competing
schools of thought regarding mathematical evidence in the criminal proof
process. But before the reader can confidently plunge into the deep waters
of case law and commentary, one more introductory explanation is necessary.
C. The Five Categories of Mathematical Evidence
The scholarly literature and case law are not organized along the lines
of categories of mathematical evidence. Indeed, this is perhaps the most
serious obstacle to the non-mathematically inclined's attempts to understand
those writings because the mathematically sophisticated authors often make
broad statements about "probabilistic evidence" which in fact only apply to
some kinds of mathematical evidence. A close analysis of the case law
demonstrates that there are five categories of mathematical evidence 9 that
arise in the discussions of mathematics in the proof process. These categories
will be briefly explained here, illuminated further in Parts II and III through
an analysis of the landmark Collins case and what has happened since, and
analyzed in detail in Part IV.
The first category will be denominated "empirical statistics." It consists
of use of statistics based on empirical sampled data to eliminate possible
culprits, while simultaneously not eliminating the defendant as the culprit.
The key characteristic of this category is that it involves no probability
calculation (although it provides data upon which the second category-
probabilities of a random match-can readily be based). Our earlier example
in explaining the meaning of "statistics" will suffice here: two of 100 suspects
have blood factor X, and blood of the perpetrator containing factor X was
found at the scene. Statistically, without formulating a probability, we can
say that the ninety-eight percent of the suspect population without blood
factor X is eliminated as suspects. If statistics exist with respect to more
than one factor, and the occurrence of the factors is mutually independent,
then the product rule for independent events can be used to multiply the
statistical frequencies together to reach a new statistical incidence of occur-
rence.
The second category consists of what will be termed "probabilities of a
random match." Any empirical statistic can be used to form such a prob-
ability. For example, if two of 100 suspects have factor X blood and the
blood of the perpetrator containing factor X was found at the scene, we
can generate several probabilities. Using only the statistics that the suspect
population contains one and only one perpetrator, and knowing that the
suspect population is 100, we can generate the probability that a random
choice from the population will be the culprit: one-one hundredth (using the
59. Statistics are clearly "facts" and thus there is no difficulty in characterizing them as
"evidence." Probabilities are more of a way of thinking about the significance of evidence and
thus more easily characterizable as "arguments" than as "evidence." Nonetheless, most courts
and commentators have characterized probabilities as "evidence" and thus we will consider
probabilities as "evidence" for purposes of this Article as well.
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classical theory since there is an equal likelihood of each person's being
selected). Using the same statistics and the frequency theory, we generate
the probability that over the long run of random choices, we would choose
the culprit one-one hundredth of the time. Using the additional information
fr6m the hypothetical, we can generate both classical and frequency proba-
bilities regarding selecting at random a person with factor X blood (one-
fiftieth), and selecting at random the culprit from a pool consisting only of
the two persons with factor X blood (one-half). Note that these probabilities
(like all classical and frequency probabilities) do not even purport to make
a statement concerning what any particular random choice would actually
turn up. Each actual choice will either turn up the characteristic at issue (a
"probability" of "1," after the fact) or not turn it up (a "probability" of
"0," after the fact).
The remaining categories of mathematical evidence all involve subjective
probabilities of the defendant's guilt. The third category is called "non-
empirical probabilities of guilt incorporating empirical statistics without
Bayes' Theorem." In this category, empirical statistics form part of the basis
for formation of a subjective probability, but not via use of Bayes' Theorem
(e.g., "Based upon my assessment of the probability of truth of the eyewit-
ness testimony plus the statistics regarding blood factors, I believe that the
defendant's guilt is extremely probable.") The fourth category is called
"non-empirical probabilities of guilt developed without empirical statistics
and without Bayes' Theorem." This category is composed of instances where
the prosecutor, in line with the mathematical probabilist tenet that all
evidence is inherently probabilistic, probabilizes non-empirically sampled
data, and then further relies on the probabilist position that the burden of
persuasion is probabilistic by arguing that the subjective probability of guilt
based upon the non-empirically sampled data is sufficient to convict, all
without using Bayes' Theorem. The quintessential example of this category
is People v. Collins.60 The fifth category is entitled "non-empirical proba-
bilities of guilt incorporating empirical statistics via Bayes' Theorem," (e.g.,
"Based upon my evaluation of the probability of truth of the eyewitness
testimony, as combined with the blood factor evidence's probability via
Bayes' Theorem, I believe that defendant's guilt is extremely probable.")
These five categories exhaust the academic debate and the case law regarding
mathematical evidence in criminal cases. A discussion of these categories
may exhaust the reader as well, but it is necessary to gain a firm understand-
ing of the subject matter. First, though, let us make sure that we understand
the most famous of all mathematical evidence cases, People v. Collins.6
II. UNDERSTANDING THE BEDROCK CASE: PEOPLE v. CouN's RE-ExAmiNED
A. The Forerunners of Collins
While People v. Collins was not the first case involving issues of
mathematical probability in the proof process, more than two decades have
60. 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968).
61. Id.
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passed since it was decided, and numerous cases involving mathematical
evidence have been the subject of appellate opinions, Collins nonetheless
remains the best-known and most influential case addressing the intersection
between mathematical probabilities and the criminal law. Commentators have
not used pale adjectives to describe their reaction to the prosecution's
approach in the case, including "bizarre," 62 a "flagrant" misuse of statistical
evidence, 63 and "notorious." 64 The Collins opinion has been hailed as a
"seminal judicial contribution" to the debate regarding probability in the
proof process. 65 In short, legal commentators have found Collins "irresisti-
ble."6
Although Collins was not the earliest case to raise probability issues, a
brief review of its three case law predecessors shows that they did not have
the ingredients necessary for staying power because either they did not
confront the mathematical issues head-on, or if they did, did not confront
them fully. The earliest and most significant of the three cases is the 1915
New York Court of Appeals case of People v. Risley.67 Defendant Risley, a
lawyer, was convicted of offering into evidence as genuine a forged and
fraudulently altered document. The prosecution's theory was that Risley had
typed in the key words on the document on a typewriter at his office.
Specimens of the typing of a machine at his office were compared with the
allegedly inserted words and-the prosecution's experts claimed that there
were eleven matching characteristics." The prosecution then called a math-
ematics professor who assumed probabilities for each of the defects, and
then used the product rule to reach the conclusion that the probability of
those defects being reproduced by a typewriter other than the defendant's
was one in four billion.69 Risley is the first, but certainly not the last, case
62. Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 23, at 496.
63. Note, Admissibility of Mathematical Evidence in Criminal Trials, 21 AM. CGum. L.
REv. 55, 61 (1983).
64. Cohen, supra note 40, at 388; Gerjuoy, The Relevance of Probability Theory to
Problems of Relevance, 18 JuRma cs J. 1, 25 (1977).
65. Green, supra note 55, at 377.
66. Gerjuoy, supra note 64, at 25.
67. 214 N.Y. 75, 108 N.E. 200 (1915). An earlier American case had involved probabilistic
evidence, but the admissibility of that evidence was never reviewed by an appellate court. That
case was the Howland Will case, discussed in 4 AM. L. REv. 625 (1870). There the authenticity
of a signature on a will was at issue. Opponents of the document claimed that the signature
had been traced by someone other than the alleged testator. Noted Harvard mathematician
Benjamin Pierce testified for the opponents. He examined 50 specimens of the decedent's
genuine signature and concluded that the downward strokes coincided about one-fifth of the
time, yet the signature on the proffered will showed 30 such coincidences with the signature on
the source from which the opponents claimed that the signature had been traced. Assuming
that each downward stroke was independent of the others, and using the product rule for
independent events, Pierce calculated that the probability of such coincidence occurring naturally
was one-fifth multiplied by itself 30 times, that is, about one in 931 millions of millions of
millions.
68. People v. Risley, 214 N.Y. 75, 83, 108 N.E. 200, 202 (1915).
69. Id. at 85, 108 N.E. at 202.
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showing how easily prosecutors can fall into the trap of (or can consciously
resort to as a gambit) the following sequence: (1) create claimed empirical
statistics which are illegitimate because they are not based upon a valid
empirical sampling (the first category described above); (2) use this statistic
to calculate the probability of a random match (the second category described
above); and (3) argue that this probability, which is invariably infinitesimal,
requires the jury to come to an extremely high subjective probability of guilt
(the third category described above), when in fact the evidence falls into the
fourth category described above-a non-empirical probability of guilt devel-
oped without empirical statistics and without Bayes' Theorem. Ostensibly,
the evidence in Risley only shows that statistically one could eliminate most
of the typewriters in the world, but not defendant's, as having produced the
words in issue, and, thus, the evidence falls into the empirical statistics
category. Clearly, though, the statistic was a spurious one, and the prose-
cution sought to use it to convince the jury that the statistical unlikelihood
of the occurrence of more than one such typewriter, combined with the fact
that Risley owned such a typewriter, should convince them that the subjective
probability of Risley's guilt closely approached one.
The New York Court of Appeals found the evidence to have been
erroneously admitted for two reasons. First, it held that the professor was
not qualified as a typewriting expert, and thus his estimates of the probability
were without foundation. 0 In mathematical terms, this meant the court
believed that there were no competent statistics upon which to base a
probability. As part and parcel of this discussion, the court made some
observations that seemed to be the beginning of a head-on attack on
mathematical probabilities in the proof process:
These factors and many others which we cannot foresee, and which,
in all likelihood, are beyond the possibility of any human being to
ascertain, would enter into any calculation of this character. The
statement of the witness was not based upon actual observed data,
but was simply speculative, and an attempt to make inferences
deduced from a general theory in no way connected with the matter
under consideration.
7'
Here is the germ of an argument that subjective probability theory does not
correctly model the proof process and thus that probabilistic evidence is
irrelevant, a position adhered to by anti-mathematical probabilists to this
day. The court in Risley, however, .did not really follow up on these
observations to the point of making them full-blown arguments, leaving the
opinion on these points subject to being overshadowed by Collins.
The second basis for reversal in Risley was that probability was an
inappropriate tool in the proof process because probability theory speaks
only to future events, not to past events: "The fact to be established in this
70. Id. at 85, 108 N.E. at 203.
71. Id.
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case was not the probability of a future event, but whether an occurrence
asserted by the people to have happened had actually taken place." 72 Here
again is a germ of an idea that is not fully developed. From a purely
mathematical standpoint the court is wrong because probability theory speaks
equally to future events, which are by their nature unknown, and unknown
past events. For example, the probability of selecting a woman lawyer at
random from the adult population of the United States is the same for a
random selection that has already been made (with the characteristics of the
selected person being concealed from the person performing the probability
calculation), as for a random selection that has not yet been made. From a
legal standpoint, however, the court's perception that a past event, which
either definitely occurred or definitely did not occur (in mathematical terms,
a posterior "probability" of "1" and "0," respectively), cannot be proven
or disproven by probabilistic evidence showing a likelihood of occurrence
between "1" and "0" has continued to be a tenet of the anti-probabilist
position. Again though, the Collins case developed this argument more fully,
and has overshadowed Risley.
The issue of probabilistic evidence in criminal cases lay dormant for
half a century after Risley. Then, in 1966, two appellate courts were
confronted with the issue. In an Arkansas case, Miller v. State,73 the
defendant was charged with burglary. A soil sample taken from where the
perpetrator had fallen near the scene was compared by an expert with soil
stains on the defendant's clothes. The expert assumed that there was a one-
tenth probability of the same color soil appearing at another location, a
one-one-hundredth probability of the same texture of soil appearing, and a
one-one-thousandth probability of the same density of soil appearing. Then,
assuming that those characteristics were independent, and applying the
product rule for independent events, the expert testified that there was a one
in a million chance that the defendant's clothing had become soiled in some
location other than the burglary scene. 74 The Arkansas Supreme Court held
that the expert's testimony had been erroneously admitted because the
assumed frequencies were without foundation 75 i.e., the statistics on which
the probability calculations were based were simply made up out of thin air.
In a New Mexico case, State v. Sneed,7 6 the defendant was charged with
murdering his parents. The prosecution sought to prove that the defendant
had purchased a .22 caliber revolver on the day prior to the murders using
the name "Robert Crosset," an allas that he had used twice in other cities
during the week before the deaths. The gun sales register kept by the pawn
shop where the gun had been purchased indicated the buyer as "Robert
Crosset" of "Box 210, Las Cruces" and that the buyer was 5'9" tall and
72. Id. at 86, 108 N.E. at 203.
73. 240 Ark. 340, 399 S.W.2d 268 (1966).
74. Miller v. State, 240 Ark. 340, 343, 399 S.W.2d 268, 270 (1966).
75. Id.
76. 76 N.M. 349, 414 P.2d 858 (1966).
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had brown eyes and brown hair. The defendant matched this description,
but the pawn shop sales clerk was unable to make a positive identification
at trial.7 7 To bolster the inference that the purchaser of the gun had been
the defendant, the prosecution called a mathematics professor who, on the
basis of review of some western states' phone books, estimated that the
chance of the name "Robert Crosset" appearing at random was one in
thirty million, and then, using the pawn shop's handgun sales register,
estimated that the probability of a gun purchaser having a combination of
brown hair and brown eyes and a height between 5'8" and 5'10" was one-
eighth, and testified that the probability of two people at random choosing
the same post office box from a bank of 1000 was one-one-thousandth.7 8
The professor used the product rule for independent events to multiply these
three figures together and arrived at the probability of one in 240 billion
that all of these characteristics would be randomly associated with one
person.7 9 The New Mexico Supreme Court found reversible error in the
admission of the professor's testimony because there was a lack of foundation
concerning the frequency estimates for both the name "Robert Crosset" and
the physical characteristics. 80 Both Miller and Sneed illustrate, like Risley, a
prosecutor's attempt to use illegitimate evidence appearing to fall into the
empirical statistics category to support an infinitesimal probability of a
random match, and then to argue that the defendant's guilt was proven by
an extremely high subjective probability. The Miller and Sneed cases are less
significant than Risley because they did not attempt to confront head-on the
issue of whether mathematically probabilistic concepts have a place in the
proof process. Rather, they simply held that the statistics on which the
probabilities were based were without proper support. 81 Thus the field
remained open for the California Supreme Court in the Collins case to make
77. Some of this information about the case does not appear as part of the appellate
opinion. It is to be found in Note, Evidence: Admission of Mathematical Probability Statistics
Held Erroneous for Want of Demonstration of Validity, 1967 DUKE L.J. 665, 666, which cites
to the brief-in-chief of the defendant in Sneed, pp. 8-11.
78. Neither the appellate opinion nor the note in the Duke Law Journal, supra note 77,
gives any indication how that particular post office box number was significant. There was
seemingly no showing that the defendant had a habit of choosing that particular post office
box number, which means that multiplying by the one-one-thousandth figure simply and
arbitrarily increases the final probability.
79. State v. Sneed, 76 N.M. 349, 352-53, 414 P.2d 858, 860-61 (1966).
80. Id. at 353-54, 414 P.2d at 861-62. The court does not mention the probability figure
regarding the post office box choice at all.
81. It is interesting to note that in a sense the Sneed case is a progeny of Collins, even
though the California Supreme Court opinion in Collins was rendered two years after the New
Mexico Supreme Court decision in Sneed. In fact, the Collins case was tried first and obtained
nationwide media exposure. This prompted the prosecutor in the Sneed case to call the prosecutor
in the Collins case to discuss the possible use of probability evidence in the Sneed case. The
Collins prosecutor recommended as an expert witness his brother-in-law, who was in fact used
by the Sneed prosecutor as his expert. This interesting tidbit is contained in a letter from
Raymond Sinetar, prosecutor in the Collins case, to the author, August 26, 1989.
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the first effort to tackle head-on the fundamental issues of the intersection
of mathematics and the proof process.
B. Collins: The Facts
The basic facts of the Collins case are plainly outlined in the California
Supreme Court opinion. Yet the question which inevitably intrigues a reader-
"What prompted the prosecutor to resort to such an unusual mode of proof
and argument?"-is not illuminated by the opinion. It is helpful, therefore,
to examine how the case developed from the perspective of the prosecuting
authorities by examining the facts provided in the People's brief for the
case, and the recollections of the prosecutor (who still remembers the case
well after two decades).
On June 18, 1964, the police in the San Pedro area of the city of Los
Angeles received a report of a robbery. Mrs. Juanita Brooks reported that
she had been shopping and was walking home along an alley in that area
of the city. She was pulling a wicker basket containing groceries, with her
purse on top. She was using a cane. As she stooped to pick up an empty
carton she was suddenly pushed to the ground by a person whom she neither
saw nor heard approach. Although stunned, she managed to look up and
saw a young woman running from the scene whom she described as weighing
about 145 pounds, wearing something dark, and having hair between dark
blond and light blond. Mrs. Brooks quickly discovered that her purse, which
had contained between thirty-five to forty dollars, was missing.Y2
The police found another eyewitness, John Bass, who lived on the street
at the end of the alley and who had been watering the lawn in front of his
house at the time of the incident. Attracted by the crying and screaming
coming from the alley, he looked in that direction and saw a woman run
out of the alleyway and enter a yellow automobile parked across the street
from him. He described the woman as Caucasian, slightly over five feet tall,
of ordinary build, with her hair in a dark blond ponytail and wearing dark
clothing. The car took off immediately and passed within six feet of Bass.
He described the driver as a black male having a mustache and beard.83
The San Pedro area of Los Angeles had a strong neighborhood feel to
it, and the police in the area believed that they had a good reading on who
most of the criminally-inclined inhabitants were.14 The police immediately
focused their suspicion regarding the Brooks robbery on Malcolm and Janet
Collins, an interracial couple in the area who drove a yellow car, and who
were on the police's list of suspicious characters. Within a day or two of
June 18, Malcolm had been brought in for a lineup and identified by Mr.
Bass. 5 The police noted that Malcolm was not wearing a beard, which made
82. People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 321, 438 P.2d 33, 34, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497, 498
(1968).
83. Id.
84. Conversation with Raymond Sinetar, prosecutor in Collins (April 12, 1989).
85. Brief for Respondent at 10, People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 497 (1968).
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Bass' identification less than certain, but also fueled the police's suspicion
because it appeared that Malcolm had changed his appearance immediately
after the robbery. Evidently the police did not feel confident enough about
the evidence to make an arrest at this point and Malcolm was released while
the police sought more evidence. On June 22, the police interviewed both
Malcolm and Janet Collins. Janet claimed that she had been at her job as
a housemaid in San Pedro from about eight o'clock the morning of the
robbery until one o'clock that afternoon. The police obviously did not believe
this alibi because later that afternoon the same officer who had conducted
the interview began surveillance of the Collinses, and for some undisclosed
reason called for other officers to meet him at the Collinses' home. As
uniformed officers approached the Collinses' front door, Malcolm ran out
the back door and was eventually discovered hiding in a neighbor's closet.
Undoubtedly, the police viewed this as one more strong fact indicating guilt.
Both Malcolm and Janet were arrested and detained for forty-eight hours,
during which time the police observed another fact which they believed
corroborative of guilt. The officer who had interviewed Janet on the morning
of June 22 noticed that after her arrest her hair appeared both shorter and
darker, leading to the conclusion that immediately after the June 22 interview
she had cut and dyed her hair to befuddle witnesses.
8 6
Further investigation unearthed other circumstantial evidence against the
Collinses. On June 19, the day after the robbery, Malcolm had paid thirty-
five dollars in traffic fines, approximately the same amount that had been
taken from Mrs. Brooks.Y Further, their alibi fell apart when Janet's
employer stated that Malcolm had picked Janet up in a yellow car at about
11:30 in the morning the day of the robbery, which would have given time
for the Collinses to have arrived at the location of the robbery in time to
commit it.88 Additionally, the eyewitness Bass identified Janet from a police
photograph that had been taken on June 22.19
Finally, on July 9, 1964, the defendants were arrested and charged.
While in custody both Janet and Malcolm talked to the police and, although
neither defendant confessed or expressly made damaging admissions, the
whole tone of the conversation evidenced a strong consciousness of guilt on
both their parts ° Further, they told inconsistent stories about how the
money Malcolm had used to pay the traffic fines had been obtained. Malcolm
stated that he had won it gambling, while Janet stated that it had come
from her earnings, even though at the time of the couple's marriage seventeen
days earlier on June 2, 1964, they had only twelve dollars to their name,
part of which had been spent on a trip to Tijuana, and Janet's earnings
86. Id.
87. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d at 323, 438 P.2d at 35, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 499.
88. Id. at 322, 438 P.2d at 34, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
89. Brief for Respondent at 8, People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 497 (1968).
90. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d at 324, 438 P.2d at 36, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
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since the marriage were not more than twelve dollars a week. 9' The final
nail in the Collinses' coffin for the prosecuting authorities was that before
the trial of the Brooks robbery, Malcolm was arrested for two other
robberies-one of a gas station and one of a restaurant-that occurred two
months after the Brooks robbery. 92
The Brooks robbery case came to trial in December, 1964. The file was
assigned to Raymond Sinetar, a Los Angeles County assistant district attor-
ney.93 Because the file appeared to be a "completely routine felony from all
appearances," the prosecutor did not get the file much in advance of trial,
perhaps the day before, or perhaps even the same day. His discussions with
the police officer witnesses, however, plus the facts in the file, soon left no
doubt in his mind that the Collinses were the culprits.
As the prosecutor put his elderly eyewitnesses on the stand, however, it
quickly became apparent that their identifications of the Collinses were
"shaky." In fact, Mrs. Brooks had never seen the driver of the car at all,
while Mr. Bass' identification of Malcolm was shaken by his uncertainty of
identification at a prior lineup. 94 One night toward the end of the prosecu-
tion's case-in-chief Mr. Sinetar lay in bed convinced of the guilt of the
Collinses, yet also convinced that his case was not nearly as strong as he
would have liked. It was clear to him that the best argument for the
91. Brief for Respondent at 22, People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 497 (1968).
92. Malcolm was tried on these charges after the trial of the Brooks robbery and convicted
of both robberies. These convictions were sustained on appeal and Malcolm was imprisoned
for these crimes. Prosecuting attorney Sinetar cannot recall for sure whether he knew that
Malcolm had allegedly committed these other robberies at the time the Brooks robbery came
to trial, but he thinks that he most likely would have. Telephone conversation of the author
with Raymond Sinetar, prosecutor in Collins (July 19, 1989).
93. The information that follows was kindly provided by Mr. Sinetar during a phone
conversation with the author on April 12, 1989. Mr. Sinetar still remembers the case vividly
because it turned into such a cause celebre. Mr. Sinetar went on to have a distinguished career.
He was with the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office for a total of about fifteen
years, leaving in 1979 to become the chief deputy district attorney for Ventura County. He is
currently a judicial attorney for the California Court of Appeals.
Unfortunately, the author was unable to track down the public defenders who represented
the Collinses. The author did manage, however, to locate the attorneys on each side who
handled the appeal. Nicholas C. Yost, who represented the state, is now a specialist in
environmental and natural resources law in a Washington, D.C., law firm. He recalls the case
as, "personally, an immense and stimulating intellectual challenge; societally, it went to the
heart of how cases are proved." Telephone conversation Nicolas C. Yost (March 15, 1989).
Rex K. DeGeorge, who represented Malcolm Collins on appeal, practices law in Beverly Hills.
At the time, he was an associate in an insurance defense law firm. He read about the case,
was intrigued, and told the partners he would like to volunteer to handle the case on appeal,
working on it after hours. They refused permission, but he took the case anyway and was
fired. He says, "That was the best thing that could have happened to me. I opened my own
practice, and was quite successful." He added an interesting twist to the facts by noting that
he remembers finding out that Malcolm and Janet were not even married; their marriage had
been void for some reason that he cannot now recall. Telephone conversation with Rex K.
DeGeorge (March 13, 1989).
94. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d at 325, 438 P.2d at 36, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
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prosecution focused on the "discrete bits of circumstantial evidence" such
as the hair color of the assailant, the color of the car, the interracial nature
of the couple, and the hair on the face of the getaway driver. As he lay in
bed pondering how to communicate the impact of those bits of circumstantial
evidence to the jury, the idea occurred to him to "funnel these subjective
words into a quantitative analysis."
Acting upon that inspiration the next morning, he telephoned a local
college to contact a mathematics instructor and eventually was put in touch
with a Mr. Martinez, who taught basic math courses. During a brief "five
minute" phone call, Martinez agreed to come to court that day to testify
about the application of the product rule. The prosecutor then went to work
attempting to decide on ballpark figures to use as statistics for the various
characteristics on which he intended to focus. He did this by asking the
clerical staff in his office for their estimates of the proportion of occurrences
of blond hair, ponytails, interracial couples, yellow cars, and facial hair on
black men. Having obtained these estimates, he decided upon the figures
that he would use at trial that day and made up a chart.
Martinez did indeed appear at the trial that day. The first time the
prosecutor had ever met him was when he walked into the courtroom.
During Martinez's brief testimony, he first identified himself and his quali-
fications and then explained the product rule using a simple hypothetical
involving the probability of rolling a certain number two times in a row
with a die. The prosecutor then showed him the chart on which were listed
the famous six factors and the probabilities estimated for them by the
prosecutor (as per his conversations with members of the clerical staff),
namely: partly yellow automobile one-tenth; man with mustache one-fourth;
girl with ponytail one-tenth; girl with blond hair one-third; Negro man with
beard one-tenth; and interracial couple in car one-one-thousandth. 9 The
prosecutor attempted to make clear that Martinez was in no way responsible
for the assigned statistics by the following question and answer sequence:
Question: "Your specialty does not equip you, I suppose, to give
us some probability of such things as a yellow car as contrasted
with any other kind of car, does it?... I appreciate the fact that
you can't assign a probability for a car being yellow as contrasted
to some other car, can you?
Answer: "No, I couldn't."' '
The prosecutor also attempted to make clear that the statistics were not to
be taken as givens by the jury but were "conservative estimates" used in a
"hypothetical way" to illustrate the application of the product rule:
Question: Mr. Martinez, if I haven't made it clear before, may I
make it clear now, that the purpose of this diagram and illustration
is only for illustrative purposes to illustrate the proposition that you
have already indicated is true that, namely, when you have separate
95. Id. at 325-26 n.10, 438 P.2d at 37 n.10, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 501 n.10.
96. Id. at 328-29 n.13, 438 P.2d at 38 n.13, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 502 n.13.
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and independent factors, that to arrive at what the likelihood would
be of their concurring, it is the product of each of their probabilities.
That is the only purpose for this diagramY7
The trial judge also attempted to bring this home to the jury, instructing
that the testimony "has only been received for the purpose of illustrating
the mathematical probabilities of various matters, the possibilities for them
occurring or re-occurring." 98 The defense objected to Martinez's testimony
on the grounds that it was immaterial, invaded the province of the jury,
and was based on unfounded assumptions. 99 The Collinses then presented
their defense. Each of them testified that they had not been in the vicinity
of the crime, but instead had gone directly from Janet's work to visit with
friends.'0° Malcolm also testified, as did other defense witnesses, that he had
shaved off his beard sixteen days before the Brooks robbery.0 1
When the time arrived for summation the prosecutor again attempted
to make clear that the individual probabilities assigned to the six character-
istics were not ironclad, but merely illustrative:
"You can put your own estimate on it, it doesn't matter. You
might, for your own purpose, put in your own figures, but the
process is the same .... I think lastly, as I say, these are my own
ideas, my own estimates, I have tried to make them conservative....
Again, it doesn't matter that I put down this figure. I would invite
counsel to use his own figures or you to use your own, just taking
these six figures alone, and I have ignored all the rest, just for
illustrative purposes the chances of their being any other couple
which fits the description of the Collinses on that occasion is at
least one in twelve million . . ." 02
The prosecutor ended his mathematical argument with a flourish, arguing
that "the chances of anyone else besides these defendants being there, ...
having every similarity, . . . is somewhat like one in a billion."' 13 These
modes of proof and argument were so original that the case was reported
by a local newspaper, from whence it was picked up by a wire service, and
eventually reported twice in Time magazine."°4 The Collinses were both
convicted and Malcolm appealed, although Janet did not. Malcolm's case
worked its way to the California Supreme Court, where a little over three
years later the court delivered its famous opinion.
97. Brief for Respondent at 45-46, People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66
Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968).
98. Id. at 42.
99. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d at 326, 438 P.2d at 37, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 323 n.5, 438 P.2d at 35 n.5, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 499 n.5.
102. Brief for Respondents at 47, People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 497 (1968).
103. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d at 326, 438 P.2d at 37, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
104. April 26, 1968, at 41; Jan. 8, 1965, at 42.
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C. Collins: The Opinion
The California Supreme Court reversed Malcolm Collins' conviction,
finding the prosecution's approach invalid for six reasons. 10 5 We need to
examine the court's opinion from two perspectives: (1) what does it say
regarding the respective virtues of the tenets of the mathematical probabilist
and anti-mathematical probabilist positions?; and (2) what does it say about
any of the five categories of mathematical evidence?
1. Lack of Foundation for the Six Statistics
At first glance, Collins appears to be an exact analog of Risley, Miller,
and Sneed-a prosecution attempt to use illegitimate empirical statistics to
support a spurious argument that there was a high subjective probability of
guilt based upon those statistics. The California Supreme Court dealt with
the prosecution's proof in the same manner as the Risley, Miller and Sneed
courts before it-the evidence was improper because of a lack of foundation
for the statistics. 1' 6 Commentators, even those who are mathematical prob-
abilists, have agreed. 107 Yet the Collins prosecutor's efforts are distinguishable
from those of the prosecutors in the earlier cases. In those earlier cases, the
prosecutors attempted to convince the jury that made-up statistics were in
fact empirical; in Collins the prosecutor told the jury that the statistics were
not empirically based, and urged them to develop their own. The prosecutor
adhered to both the basic probabilistic tenet that all evidence is probabilistic,
as is the reasoning from proof to conclusion, and to the utilitarian probabilist
position that the burden of persuasion is probabilistic. The court's rejection
of the prosecution's efforts means that it did not agree: (1) that all evidence
is probabilistic; (2) that the burden of persuasion is probabilistic (although
the court is more explicit regarding this point later in the opinion); and (3)
that the fourth category discussed above-non-empirical probabilities of guilt
developed without empirical statistics and without Bayes' Theorem-is an
appropriate one in a criminal case.
2. Mutual Dependance of the Six Factors
The second reason for reversal was that there was no showing of mutual
independence of the six factors which would legitimate the use of the product
rule.10 Indeed, it is obvious to most readers of the opinion that at least two
of the characteristics are not independent, namely, "man with mustache"
105. Malcolm was not retried on the charge. According to the prosecutor's recollection,
since Malcolm had been convicted and sentenced for two other robberies in a subsequent trial,
which convictions were not reversed on appeal, it would have served no purpose to have retried
him on the Brooks robbery, because even if convicted he would not have stood to serve any
more time. Conversation with Raymond Sinetar (April 12, 1989).
106. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d at 327, 438 P.2d at 38-39, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
107. See, e.g., Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 23 (the first scholarly proponents of the
use of mathematics in the proof process).
108. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d at 327, 438 P.2d at 38-39, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 503.
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and "Negro man with beard," since the occurrence of mustaches and beards
are related to each other. Further, other possible dependencies exist. For
example, it is possible that "girls with blond hair" wear their hair in ponytails
more frequently than do "girls" with other color hair. Similarly, it is possible
that an interracial couple in a car is more likely to be found in a yellow
automobile than are non-interracial couples. Further, it is possible that
"Negro men with beards" prefer the company of "girls with blond hair"
as opposed to "girls" with other color hair. Thus the court's conclusion
that the testimony was defective because independence of the factors was
not shown has struck virtually every reader of the opinion as correct. There
are three points to be made here, however, before we leave this topic. First,
it should be noted how easily the prosecution could have avoided the most
obvious dependency, that is, the one between "man with mustache" and
"Negro man with beard." The prosecutor could simply have combined the
two factors and estimated a probability of a "Negro man with mustache
and a beard." His failure to do so is probably reflective of the haste with
which the demonstration was conceived and presented. Second, aside from
the obvious dependency between mustaches and beards which we know from
common experience are correlated, our intuition regarding the likelihood of
the other possible dependencies is much weaker. We have no strong feeling
that, for example, "Negro men with beards" prefer yellow automobiles in
a higher proportion than other groups in the population, or that "girls with
blond hair" wear ponytails with substantially greater frequency than "girls"
with other color hair. In short, while it is true that the prosecutor did not
prove a lack of mutual dependence, our intuition regarding most of the
factors is that they are likely not to be mutually dependent or, if they are,
only to a small extent. Third, and most importantly, to the extent that there
is a possibility of mutual dependency, the significance of this fact should be
minimal under the subjective theory of probability. Non-empirical probabil-
ities are acknowledged to be only ballpark common sense estimates anyway.
They result in a final probability using the product rule that is not exact,
but only suggestive of a likelihood. Thus, by rejecting the prosecution's
approach, the court emphasized that probabilizing non-empirically sampled
data is inappropriate in the proof process.
3. Defects in "the Entire Enterprise"
a. What Was "the Entire Enterprise" Upon Which the Prosecution
Embarked?
The California Supreme Court stated that even after assuming away the
lack of foundation defect and the mutual dependence defect, "the entire
enterprise upon which the prosecution embarked ... was gravely misguided" '10
in two ways. But before we can fully understand the court on those two
109. Id. at 329-31, 438 P.2d at 39-40, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 503-04.
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points, we must be clear regarding what exactly was the enterprise upon
which the prosecution embarked. The prosecutor was not clear and, unfor-
tunately, as will be shown, neither was the court. But before we can see
how both the prosecutor and the court were muddled in their thinking, we
must try to identify exactly what enterprises were available for the prosecution
to embark upon. From a mathematical standpoint, there are three separate
and distinct "enterprises" upon which the prosecution might have embarked.
First, the prosecution could have attempted to calculate the probability
of a random match, i.e., that a randomly chosen couple from a population
that included the Collinses would have all six characteristics. Assuming that
the statistical occurrence of each factor was independent of the others, the
product rule would tell us that all six characteristics would appear in one
couple in twelve million. The probability of a random match that naturally
follows, using the classical theory, is that there is a one in twelve million
chance that any couple picked at random from the population would manifest
those six characteristics." 0 The second enterprise upon which the prosecution
might have embarked was the following: given that we know there is one
couple in the population, namely the Collinses, who possess all six charac-
teristics, what is the probability that, excluding the Collinses from the
population, there is another couple which duplicates those characteristics?
This will be referred to as the "probability of duplication." Surprisingly to
the non-mathematically inclined, this calculation, which stated in prose seems
little different than the probability of a random match is, from a mathe-
matical standpoint, entirely different. Further, the "probability of duplica-
tion" calculation is much more complex. The complicated formula for
calculating the "probability of duplication" is set forth in the Appendix to
the Collins opinion,"' and is discussed at length in the scholarly literature."
2
This lengthy calculation does not need to be repeated here, although a brief
comment will be made later concerning the population figure that the court
chose for its calculation." 3 It is sufficient for our purposes to note two
things. First, the probability of a random match and the probability of
duplication are quite distinct mathematically. Second, unless the suspect
population is quite small, the probability of duplication will be dramatically
higher (i.e., more likely) than the probability of a random match." 4 The
110. See, e.g., Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 23. "Because the court was dealing with
an existing, finite population, the frequency with which couples with the identifying characteristics
may be found in that population is identical to the probability of selecting one at random."
Id. at 493.
111. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d at 333-35, 438 P.2d at 42-43, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 506-07.
112. See, e.g., R. EGOLESTON, EViDENcE, PROOF AND PROBABIT 241-47 (2d ed. 1983).
Charrow & Smith, A Conversation About "A Conversation About Collins", 64 Gao. L.J. 669
(1976); Cullison, Identification by Probabilities, and Trial by Arithmetic (A Lesson for Beginners
in How to be Wrong with Greater Precision), 6 Hous. L. Ray. 471, 495-98 (1969); Fairley &
Mosteller, A Conversation About Collins, 41 U. Cm. L. REv. 242, 248-52 (1974); Finkelstein
& Fairley, supra note 23, at 492-95.
113. See infra note 127.
114. For example, using a suspect population of twelve million couples, the court calculated
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third enterprise upon which the prosecution might have embarked is to
calculate whether the Collinses were in fact the guilty couple. This will be
referred to as the "probability of guilt." This calculation differs from both
the probability of a random match and the probability of duplication. The
probability of guilt can be mathematically modeled, but is even more complex
than the probability of duplication. Professor Alan Cullison undertook in
an article shortly after Collins to explain in mathematical terms the derivation
and application of the formula needed to engage in the probability of guilt
calculation." 5 The explanation consumes twelve pages and, despite Professor
Cullison's lucidity, is virtually incomprehensible to one not possessing a high
level of mathematical sophistication. 1 6 Again, the mathematical formula
need not be repeated here since the key fact to be noted is that the calculation
differs both from the probability of a random match and the probability of
duplication.
1 7
Given these three possible enterprises, exactly which enterprise did the
prosecution embark upon in Collins? The answer seems to be "some of
each." As has been shown, the prosecutor had set sail across very deep
mathematical waters. Given the spur-of-the-moment nature of the prosecu-
tor's consultation with the mathematician, we can be confident that the
prosecutor did not understand the difference among the three probability
calculations, and thus it is not surprising that he was not clear regarding
exactly what the evidence was intended to show. According to the court, the
prosecutor sought to convince the jury "that there was but one chance in
twelve million that any [other] couple possessed the distinctive characteristics
of the defendants."" 8 While this could be read as either a probability of a
random match argument or as a probability of duplication argument, the
latter seems to be more true to the prosecutor's intentions. Similarly, the
prosecution's argument that "the chances of anyone else besides these
defendants being there, having every similarity, is somewhat like one in one
billion"" 9 could be read as either of those arguments, but again seems to
be better read as a probability of duplication argument. According to the
court, the prosecutor also sought to convince the jury that "it was to be
inferred that there could be but one chance in twelve million that the
defendants were innocent,"'' 2 which clearly appears to be a probability of
guilt argument. In summary, while the prosecutor was somewhat muddled,
the probability of duplication as 41% compared with the one in twelve million figure suggested
by the prosecution, which is in practical effect zero percent. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d at 334-35, 438
P.2d at 42-43, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 506-07.
115. Cullison, supra note 112.
116. Id. at 484-95.
117. For an attempt to calculate the probability of guilt on the facts in Collins, see
Kingston, Probability & Legal Proceedings, 57 J. CanM. L. CRIM~oNoY & POL. Smi. 93 (1966),
which reaches the conclusion that in the long run about five percent of the conclusions of guilt
in cases exactly like Collins could be expected to be in error. Id. at 97.
118. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d at 325, 438 P.2d at 37, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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probably the best characterization of his argument is that it was primarily a
probability of duplication argument, with the probability of duplication being
so small that it could be disregarded and the jury could conclude that the
probability of guilt was certain.
1 2
1
Did the court, then, correctly characterize the prosecutor's "enterprise",
which it found to be "greatly misguided"? While the court eventually did
correctly characterize the prosecution's argument, the beginning of its analysis
is questionable. Examine the opening paragraph of the discussion:
We now turn to the second fundamental error caused by the prob-
ability testimony. Quite apart from our foregoing objections to the
specific technique employed by the prosecution to estimate the
probability in question, we think that the entire enterprise upon
which the prosecution embarked, and which was directed to the
objective of measuring the likelihood of a random couple possessing
the characteristics allegedly distinguishing the robbers, was gravely
misguided. At best, it might yield an estimate as to how infrequently
bearded Negroes drive yellow cars in the company of blond females
with ponytails.'2 (Emphasis added.)
There are two questionable aspects to this paragraph. First, the court
identifies the enterprise upon which the rosecution' had embarked as "meas-
uring the likelihood of a random couple possessing the characteristics alleg-
edly distinguishing the robbers." As we have just pointed out, the prosecution
was not attempting primarily to use a probability of a random match
argument, but rather was attempting to use probability of duplication and
probability of guilt arguments. Second, the court indicates that "an estimate
as to how infrequently bearded Negroes drive yellow cars in the company
of blond females with ponytails" is dramatically different from the calcu-
lation "measuring the likelihood of a random couple possessing the char-
acteristics allegedly distinguishing the robbers." In fact, as was pointed out
earlier,' these two figures are little more than restatements of each other:
once the frequency of occurrence of the six characteristics and their mutual
independence is assumed, the probability of a random match naturally
follows. Surprisingly, these two weaknesses in the opinion have never been
pointed out despite the voluminous commentary and numerous case cites to
Collins.
After this shaky beginning, the court succeeded in righting itself in the
next paragraph when it noted that one of the reasons that it doubted the
prosecution's approach could furnish guidance on the crucial issue of deter-
mining which of the admittedly few such couples could have been guilty of
121. See also Cullison, supra note 112. "The prosecutor was neither clear nor consistent
in identifying his exact purpose in bringing probability theory into the Collins case." Id. at
477.
122. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d at 329-30, 438 P.2d at 39-40, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 503-04.
123. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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committing the robbery was that the probability did not prove that "only
one couple possessing those distinctive characteristics could be found in the
entire Los Angeles area."2 4 Thus, the court realized that the thrust of the
prosecution's argument relied on the low probability of duplication from
which the prosecutor extrapolated an astronomically high probability of guilt.
The court correctly recognized that, even assuming away the foundation and
mutual dependence problems, the most that the prosecution's formula "could
ever yield would be a measure of the probability that a random couple
would possess the distinctive features in question." 2- The court then referred
to its Appendix, which showed that "the prosecution's figures actually imply
a likelihood of over 40 percent that the Collinses could be 'duplicated' by
at least one other couple who might equally have committed the San Pedro
robbery." 26 Having caught the prosecution's drift, the court proceeded to
find two defects in the approach."27
124. Collins, 68 Cal.2d at 330, 438 P.2d at 40, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. While the mathematical computations performed by the Collins court in the Appendix
are indisputably correct, there is some considerable question whether the suspect population
figure, set by the court at 12 million, is the proper figure to have been used. Apparently the
court selected that figure simply by assuming that since the probability of a random couple's
possessing those six characteristics was one in 12 million, a population of 12 million sample
couples was logical. Yet in fact there is no special reason for selecting a suspect population of
12 million couples just because the probability of a random couple's possessing the six
characteristics is one in 12 million. See Fairley & Mosteller, supra note 112, at 251. The object
should not have been simply to take the number of couples which would seem to be required
to generate one couple possessing all six characteristics, but rather to find the sample population
best representing the number of couples who might have committed the crime. Then it could
be determined out of that population what the likelihood was that more than one couple
possessing those characteristics existed. Accordingly, 12 million couples seems highly arbitrary.
Yet what the correct suspect population figure should be is highly problematical. On the one
hand, one could argue that the 12 million figure is far too high for the very reason that the
entire "coupled" population of the Los Angeles area, even including visitors who did not reside
in that area, must have been much smaller than 12 million in 1964. One could argue for an
even smaller suspect population on the theory that some proportion of the "coupled" population
of the Los Angeles metropolitan area on the day of the crime could not physically have been
at the scene at the time the crime occurred. On the other hand, one could argue that a suspect
population of 12 million couples understates the correct size because theoretically any couple in
the United States (or the United States and Mexico, or the whole world) could have been in
Los Angeles on the day of the crime. Yet given what the court was doing in the Appendix,
which was basically playing along with the prosecution's approach, it seems that the most
logical suspect population would have been the population from which the prosecution had
calculated the probabilities for the six characteristics. The prosecution never made clear what
was the population from which those estimates were made, but implicitly it seems that it must
have been roughly the population of the Los Angeles metropolitan area (presumably including
a generous addition for couples who did not reside there but who were physically there that
day). This population could have been only roughly determined, but would certainly have been
several times less than 12 million couples. Decreasing the size of the suspect population to a
more realistic level, say to something like two million, would have dramatically decreased the
probability of duplication.
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b. Traditionally Nonprobabilistic Evidence Cannot Be "Probabilized"
Via the Subjective Theory
As a third basis for reversal, the court stated that: "[The prosecution's
theory of probability rested on the assumption that the witnesses called by
the People had conclusively established that the guilty couple possessed the
precise characteristics relied on by the prosecution. But no mathematical
formula could ever establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution's
witnesses correctly observed and accurately described the distinctive features
which were employed to link defendant to the crime."' 2s Here the court was
at its most vigorous in rejecting the probabilist principle that all evidence,
and the burden of persuasion, is probabilistic: "[Tihe likelihood of human
error or of falsification obviously cannot be quantified; that likelihood must
therefore be excluded from any effort to assign a number to the probability
of guilt or innocence.
1 29
c. The Probabilistic Evidence Was Insufficient, Even if Proper
Foundation and Mutual Dependence Are Assumed
As a fourth basis for reversal, the court noted that even if the prosecution
had used the figure obtained from the product rule for its mathematically
proper purpose, which was to demonstrate the low probability of a random
match, that probability "could furnish the jury with absolutely no guidance
on the crucial issue: Of the admittedly few such couples, which one, if any,
was guilty of committing this robbery?... Urging that the Collinses be
convicted on the basis of evidence which logically establishes no more than
this seems as indefensible as arguing for the conviction of X on the ground
that a witness saw either X or X's twin commit the crime."' 30 It is clear
that the court found the evidence to be insufficient, but insufficient in what
respect? The most obvious reading is that the evidence was insufficient to
support a conviction, i.e., an argument going to the weight of the evidence,
not its admissibility. But this reading is bedeviled by the fact that the issue,
as framed by the parties and the court, was one of admissibility, not
sufficiency. If the court had really been conducting a review of the sufficiency
of the evidence, it would have looked at all the evidence in the case, including
an eyewitness identification, and would likely have found sufficient evidence
to support the conviction. The less obvious reading is that the court found
the evidence to have zero probative value, and thus insufficient evidentiary
worth to even be relevant. This reading, while not without difficulty, is
probably the preferable one because it comports with the admissibility issue
before the court.
128. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d at 330, 438 P.2d at 40, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
129. Id. It is possible to read the opinion on this point, as does Professor Kaye, as not
rejecting the assigning of a subjective probability, but rather rejecting an attempt to derive such
a probability from a mathematical formula. Letter from Professor Kaye to David McCord (May
15, 1990). The author believes that the Collins opinion sweeps more broadly than that.
130. Id. at 330-31, 438 P.2d at 40-41, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 504-505.
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4. Can the "Beyond a Reasonable Doubt" Standard Be Quantified?
The fifth basis for reversal found by the court was the prosecution's
attempted probabilization of the burden of persuasion. The court character-
ized the prosecutor's summation to the jury as follows:
[Tihe prosecutor told the jurors that the traditional idea of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt represented "the most hackneyed, ster-
eotyped, trite, misunderstood concept in criminal law." He sought
to reconcile the jury to the risk that, under his "new math" approach
to criminal jurisprudence, "on some rare occasion .. . an innocent
person may be convicted." "Without taking that risk," the prose-
cution continued, "life would be intolerable because there would be
immunity for the Collinses, for people who chose not to be employed
to go down and push old ladies down and take their money and be
immune because how could we ever be sure they are the ones who
did it? '1'
The court concluded, "In essence this argument of the prosecutor was
calculated to persuade the jury to convict defendants whether or not they
were convinced of their guilt to a moral certainty and beyond a reasonable
doubt."' 132 A clearer rejection of the utilitarian probabilist position that the
burden of persuasion is probabilistic cannot be imagined. Instead, the court,
by using the concept of elimination of doubt "to a moral certainty," clasped
to its bosom the anti-probabilist position that all plausible explanations
inconsistent with guilt must be negated by the prosecution before guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt can be found.
5. The Mathematical Arguments Were Unfairly Prejudicial
The sixth basis for reversal was the court's conclusion that not only did
the mathematical probabilities have no probative value, they caused unfair
prejudice. Most of the unfair prejudice found by the court inhered in the
prosecution's misuse of the "probability of a random match" with the
"probability of duplication" and "probability of guilt," coupled with the
fact that the defense attorney had no advance warning to prepare to meet
the evidence.133 But even though the court asserted that it was making no
generally applicable "appraisal of the proper applications of mathematical
techniques in the proof of facts,' ' 34 the court went on to intimate its feeling
that juries may generally not be competent to deal with such evidence: "[W]e
have strong feelings that such [mathematical] applications, particularly in a
criminal case, must be critically examined in view of the substantial unfairness
to a defendant which may result from ill conceived techniques with which
131. Id. at 331-32, 438 P.2d at 41, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 330-31, 438 P.2d at 40-41, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
134. Id. at 331, 438 P.2d at 41, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
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the trier of fact is not technically equipped to cope.""13 This position again
strongly supports the anti-probabilist side of the debate.
D. Why Collins Has Had Staying Power
There are at least six reasons why Collins became and has remained the
preeminent case regarding mathematical probability in the proof process.
First, the facts are vivid and memorable. 3 6 Second, Collins was the first
case in which the prosecution used subjective probabilities based on acknow-
ledgedly non-empirical data. This meant that the stakes were high-if the
prosecutor's technique in Collins had passed scrutiny, one imagines that
many other prosecutors would have tried the technique. Third, the case was
decided by the California Supreme Court as opposed to the supreme court
of some smaller and less influential state. Fourth, the Collins court was the
first to tackle the issue of mathematics in the proof process head-on. The
court's elaborate mathematical Appendix in particular demonstrated the
willingness of the court to engage the probabilists on their own turf. Fifth,
the Collins case has struck most readers as powerfully reasoned and correctly
decided. For a case addressing an issue that was both fundamental and
novel, Collins is a remarkably sophisticated opinion. Sixth and finally, Collins
was decided at a propitious moment in the history of evidence scholarship.
As Professor Richard Lempert has noted, by the mid-1960s the great com-
mon-law evidence authorities such as Wigmore, Maguire, and McCormick
had finished their work, but no new significant evidence scholarship efforts
were being undertaken. 3 7 Interest in the field was awakened, however, by
the drafting and promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence shortly
thereafter, which led to a transformation of evidence scholarship "from a
field concerned with the articulation of rules to a field concerned with the
process of proof."'13 8 Professor Lempert adds that "[N]owhere is the concern
for proof more central than in that body of scholarship which seeks to build
on or criticize mathematical models as modes of proof or as a means of
understanding trial processes."' 3 9 Indeed, there is a bit of a "chicken and
egg" problem here about whether Collins had a significant role in providing
impetus to this wave of evidence scholarship, or whether Collins merely rode
the wave of interest in a topic that was already of concern. In any event,
Collins is generally identified with the inception of this trend in evidence
scholarship."40 This is evidenced by the preeminence of Collins in law school
135. Id.
136. In informal conversations with colleagues the author has discovered that even profes-
sors whose areas of expertise are far removed from evidence law at least vaguely remember
"that crazy case involving the woman with the pony tail, the black man and the yellow car.
137. Lempert, supra note 49, at 439.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 440.
140. See, e.g., Green, supra note 55, at 377. "After Collins, judges and scholars questioned
whether mathematical proof should be admitted under any circumstances, even assuming that
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evidence texts, which provide the introduction for most lawyers and attorneys
to the issues of mathematical probabilities in the proof process.
141
III. AN OVERVIEW OF CASE LAW AND SCHOLARSHIP SINCE Collins
The substance of the case law and scholarship since Collins has already
been largely revealed in the earlier summary of the probabilist and anti-
probabilist positions, and will be examined further in the analysis included
in Part IV. It will be helpful, however, to gain an overview of the case law
and scholarship in the two decades subsequent to Collins to illuminate the
trends that have developed over that time which have led to the current state
of case law and scholarship.
The case law in the first decade following Collins is easily reviewed since
only one significant criminal case involving probabilistic issues was decided
during that period, and that case had already been in the judicial pipeline
before the Collins decision was rendered.' 42 Either prosecutors during that
decade did not think of using probabilistic techniques, or defendants did not
seek to challenge such efforts on appeal-both of which seem unlikely-or
Collins had a powerful general deterrent effect. On the scholarly front,
however, Collins proved to be anything but a deterrent: it spawned an
outburst of scholarly writing, two pieces of which are well known even
today. 143 The first noteworthy article spawned by Collins, by Michael Fin-
kelstein and William Fairley, was entitled "A Bayesian Approach To Iden-
tification Evidence.'' 44 The first part of the article examined the Collins case
the particular defects in the proof in that case could be avoided. In the ensuing debate, numerous
blue buses have run untold numbers of near-sighted elderly ladies off the road, hundreds of
alleged gate crashers have been collared, dozens of murderous prisoners have been brought to
justice, and countless articles, books and opinions have been written on the subject." Id. at
377-78.
141. This author has 14 evidence texts on his shelf, 11 of which contain a substantial
number of judicial opinions and three of which do not. Of the 11 texts that include a substantial
number of opinions, Collins is used as a principal case in seven of them, as a note case in two
of them, and not mentioned in the other two. Of the three books that have virtually no opinions
in them, Collins is mentioned in a footnote in two of them and not mentioned in the other
one.
142. State v. Coolidge, 109 N.H. 403, 260 A.2d 547 (1969), rev'd on other grounds, 403
U.S. 443 (1971). For a discussion of this case, see infra notes 232-35 and accompanying text.
143. Collins is one of those unusual cases that generated scholarly commentary even before
the California Supreme Court opinion was rendered. See Stoebuck, Relevancy and the Theory
of Probability, 51 IowA L. Rnv. 849, 859-61 (1966); Kingston, supra note 117, at 93; Note,
Criminal Law: Mathematical Probabilities Misapplied to Circumstantial Evidence, 50 MiN. L.
REv. 745 (1966). None of these articles attained lasting prominence. Immediately after the
publication of the opinion, two articles (in addition to the two that became famous) were
published, and both are quite helpful. One, Broun & Kelly, supra note 7, at 23, was the first
attempt to survey the intersection between mathematical probability and the proof process. The
second, Cullison, supra note 112, was a scintillating mathematical tour de force which analyzed
the technical mathematical aspects of Collins with a sure-handedness that cannot be improved
upon.
144. Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 23.
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and concluded that the California Supreme Court had been correct in its
decision, 45 but it was the second portion of the article which caught the
fancy of legal scholars. There, Finkelstein and Fairley advocated a "modest"
use of Bayes' Theorem to apprise the jury of the proper weight to be
accorded to trace evidence left by a defendant at a crime scene. They argued
that where trace evidence such as palm prints, blood, hair, etc. is found at
a crime scene, and it is established that the trace matches a trace that could
have been left by the defendant, but not by a very large percentage of
persons in the general populace, the jury should be presented with a chart
illustrating how the small probability of a random person having left the
trace at the scene should affect the jury's assessment of the defendant's
guilt, formed on the basis of non-trace evidence. 14 This argument became
famous for two reasons. First, it was in the vanguard in relating Bayes'
Theorem to the trial process' 47 and was the first to take a position in favor
of using it.'41 Second, it provoked the other famous article that was spawned
by Collins: Lawrence Tribe's "Trial By Mathematics: Precision and Ritual
In the Legal Process."' 49 In fact, Tribe's article became even more prominent
and influential than Finkelstein and Fairley's piece. Tribe's article has been
characterized by scholars as "brilliant and enormously helpful,"'"50 "justly
celebrated,"' 5' and so powerful that it "almost shattered"' 5 2 the movement
to advocate the use of probabilistic proof at trial. Courts have been even
more taken with Tribe's article than scholars: while telling salvos have been
launched at Tribe's arguments by scholars, and numerous other works of
scholarship have been published regarding mathematical evidence in the
proof process during the ensuing two decades, Tribe's article continues to
be virtually the only scholarly piece ever cited by courts when they deal with
mathematical issues.
53
Tribe's article was as skeptical about the advisability of the use of Bayes'
Theorem in the proof process as Finkelstein and Fairley's article was hopeful.
Many of Tribe's numerous objections to the use of Bayes' Theorem at trial
were easily generalizable to all probabilistic modes of proof, whether they
involved Bayes' Theorem or not. Ironically, while Tribe might thus be viewed
145. Id. at 489-96.
146. Id. at 500-02.
147. The concept had been broached earlier in two articles, Kaplan, supra note 41, at
1084-91, and Ball, supra note 28, at 807.
148. Ironically, Collins, which served to spark the Bayesian debate, did not involve any
use of Bayes' Theorem.
149. Tribe, supra note 31.
150. J. WIGMORE, supra note 13, at 37.6.
151. Lempert, supra note 49, at 441-42.
152. Tillers, supra note 26, at 884.
153. Collins and the Finkelstein and Fairley/Tribe debate directly spawned some additional
scholarship of lesser significance, including Finkelstein and Fairley's rebuttal, A Comment on
"Trial by Mathematics," 84 HAv. L. Rnv. 1801 (1971), and Tribe's surrebuttal, A Further
Critique of Mathematical Proof, 84 HA v. L. Rnv. 1810 (1971). See also, e.g., Charrow &
Smith, supra note 112, at 669; Fairley & Mosteller, supra note 112, at 242.
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as an anti-probabilist, in fact he tacitly acknowledged that the proof process
could be correctly described in probabilistic terms, even though he believed
that jurors would only be confused by injecting probabilities. Tribe did,
though, vigorously oppose the utilitarian strand of probabilism, arguing that
it exacted too great a cost in terms of forcing acknowledgement by the legal
system that it is willing to sacrifice an occasional innocent defendant. 154
But while the force of Collins and Tribe's article seemingly deterred
prosecutors from using mathematical techniques in criminal cases, the use
of statistics and probabilities in civil cases was growing apace. In particular,
litigation under anti-discrimination statutes such as the Equal Pay Act of
1963,111 the Civil Rights Act of 1964,156 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965
s7
typically involved statistical and probabilistic evidence.' Further, in the mid-
1970s both evidence scholars and non-legal scholars interested in the concept
of inference and proof began to focus on the proof process. This interest
produced three important books in the mid-1970s, all of which dealt with
the intersection between probabilities and the proof process. The first of
these, Professor Glenn Shafer's A Mathematical Theory Of Evidence,'59 in
1976, contended that the proof process could be modeled in mathematical
terms, but that the appropriate terms were not the traditional probabilistic
tools (the frequency theory, the subjective theory, the product rule for
independent events, and Bayes' Theorem). Shafer's proposed alternative
system is rich and complex, but his basic complaint with traditional proba-
bilistic tools as applied to the proof process is the "additivity property" that
undergirds those tools, i.e., that the probability of something happening and
the probability of that same thing not happening must equal one.1' Shafer
contended that a more flexible system is necessary for expressing beliefs in
light of evidence. For example, the system may wish to distinguish between
both "disbelief" and "lack of belief," and between "disproof" and "lack
of proof.' 6' While it is difficult to pigeonhole Shafer in either the probabilist
or anti-probabilist camp (since his work does not directly address the tenets
over which those camps do battle), it seems fair to say that his position
tends toward the anti-probabilist side.
154. Tribe, supra note 31, at 1358 et seq.
155. 29 U.S.C. 206(d) (1988).
156. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2000e-17 (1988).
157. 42 U.S.C. 1971, 1973-1973bb(a) (1988).
158. For a discussion of the influence of litigation under these statutes on the development
of the intersection between mathematical probabilities and the law, see Cohen, supra note 40,
at 387.
159. While at first glance the title of Shafer's book would lead one to believe that it was
written from a legal perspective, in fact Shafer is a statistician, not a lawyer, and the book is
not primarily concerned with the legal concept of proof, but with concept as it is applied by
statisticians. Nonetheless, Shafer's work is taken seriously by evidence scholars, as is evidenced
by Shafer's participation in the Boston University Symposium. See Shafer, supra note 37.
160. For an excellent overview of Shafer's system, see Schum, supra note 26, at 847.
161. Id.
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The second influential book concerning proof processes published in the
mid-1970s was L. Jonathan Cohen's The Probable And The Provable, in
1977. Like Shafer, Cohen was concerned about the "additivity property,"
and found other deficiencies in the traditional probabilistic system (Cohen
calls this system the "Pascalian" system) when it is used to describe the
legal proof process. He compiled a list of six "anomalies and paradoxes"
which he claimed would inevitably emerge from any attempt to explain the
process of judicial proof in "Pascalian" terms. 16 2 Cohen proposed an alter-
native system of "inductive" probability which he traced back to Sir Francis
Bacon, and thus termed "Baconian."' Cohen's system, although compli-
cated, in essence stands foursquare in favor of the anti-probabilist tenet that
the burden of persuasion can only be met through the process of eliminating
alternative explanations inconsistent with guilt. Cohen's work has been the
lightning rod which has attracted much of the scholarship in the area.'
64
As a counterpoint to Shafer and Cohen, the third influential book
published in the mid-1970s concerning the proof process was vigorous in its
support of traditional probabilistic concepts in the proof process. This book
was Michael Finkelstein's Quantitative Methods In Law: Studies In The
Application Of Mathematical Probability And Statistics To Legal Problems,
published in 1978. Finkelstein's book provoked two book reviews which have
become well known, one of which was quite critical of his approach, 65 and
the other of which was more complimentary.' 66
The year 1978 heralded more than the publication of Finkelstein's book:
after a ten year drought following Collins, appellate opinions in criminal
cases involving probabilistic modes of proof began to appear again. Increases
in scientific knowledge concerning blood and hair characteristics during the
162. L. COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 49-120 (1977). For a good overview
of Cohen's system, see Schum, supra note 26, at 853.
163. L. COHEN, supra note 162, at 124-41.
164. Cohen first proposed his ideas in THE PROBABLE AND TBE PROVABLE in 1977. Some
of his subsequent defenses include: Cohen, supra note 44, at 635; Cohen, supra note 56, at
627; Cohen, supra note 37, at 91. The attacks on Cohen are virtually too many to list, although
representative ones include: R. EGGLmSroN, supra note 112, at 34-49; Fienberg, Misunderstanding,
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, 66 B.U.L. REv. 651 (1986); Kaye, supra note 49, at 101; Williams,
supra note 28, at 297; Williams, The Mathematics Of Proof-I, 1979 Cast. L. REV. 340. In
fact, at times the debate has become quite scathing. Consider this exchange between two civilized
Englishmen. Professor Williams, in The Mathematics of Proof-I, supra, at 354, states in a
review of Cohen's book that: "In almost all other respects, so far as they are of legal interest,
he has arrived at wrong conclusions (or, at best, of right conclusions adulterated by misleading
elements), on account of what seem to me to be palpable errors of reasoning." Professor Cohen
responded, "In sum, I should have expected worthier and more pointed objections from
Professor Williams." Cohen, supra note 37, at 103. Professor Williams rejoined, characterizing
one of Cohen's footnotes as "rather disgraceful", chastising Cohen for a lack of "grace" to
admit his mistakes, and concluding "it is difficult to avoid the feeling that Mr. Cohen is
immune against criticism because he is determined never to admit an error." Williams, Rejoinder,
supra note 28, at 106-07.
165. Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 16.
166. Kaye, Book Review, Naked Statistical Evidence, 89 YALE L.J. 601 (1980).
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decade following Collins emboldened prosecutors to use mathematics to
demonstrate that the defendant was one of a very small percentage of the
population who could have left an incriminating trace at the scene. With
regard to blood, by the mid-1970s scientists had amassed data showing that
many blood factors existed besides the traditional ABO typing system factors,
and that these new factors were mutually independent. With respect to hair
identification, while comparison evidence that a hair from a known source
"was consistent with" a hair from an unknown source had been admitted
since at least 1882,167 by the mid-1970s statistical data had been developed
upon which experts were willing to opine regarding the likelihood of hairs
from different individuals being consistent with each other.' 6 Statistics
derived from blood trace evidence and hair comparisons began to appear in
appellate opinions in 1978 and have continued to appear ever since. 6 9
Scholarly literature addressed specifically to these kinds of evidence soon
followed.1 70 Prosecutors on occasion used more idiosyncratic kinds of trace
evidence statistics as well, such as those relating to bitemarks and fiber
matches. Sometimes prosecutors offered empirical statistics merely for their
inclusive/exclusive effect, and on other occasions to calculate the probability
of a random match. Often defendants argued that the statistical evidence
was implicitly used for the still further purpose of calculating a subjective
probability regarding the defendant's guilt. Prosecutors did in fact explicitly
use such subjective probabilities in the area of sex crimes where a child was
born allegedly as a result of sex acts with which the defendant was charged,
and blood factor evidence was used to calculate the defendant's "probability
167. Knoll v. State, 55 Wis. 249, 12 N.W. 369 (1882), is apparently the first case at the
appellate level.
168. Gaudette & Keeping, An Attempt at Determining Probabilities in Human Scalp Hair
Comparison, 19 J. FoRENsIc Sci. 599 (1974); Gaudette, Probabilities and Human Pubic Hair
Comparisons, 21 J. FoaRNsIc Sci. 514 (1976).
169. The first cases involving blood factors are State v. Carlson, 267 N.W.2d L70 (Minn.
1978) (holding the testimony inadmissible as unfairly prejudicial); and State v. Rolls, 389 A.2d
824 (Me. 1978) (holding the testimony properly admitted). The first hair comparison case
involving the Royal Canadian Mounted Police probability figures is the Minnesota case just
referred to, State v. Carlson, 267 N.W.2d 170 (Minn. 1978) (holding the testimony improperly
admitted because it was unfairly prejudicial). Also in 1978 a probability based upon bite mark
comparisons was held to have been properly admitted in State v. Garrison, 120 Ariz. 255, 585
P.2d 563 (1978). For a further discussion of this case, see infra notes 236-39 and accompanying
text.
170. See Barnett & Ogle, Probabilities and Human Hair Comparison, 27 J. FoRENslc ScL
272 (1982); Imwinkelried, Forensic Hair Analysis: The Case Against the Under-Employment of
Scientific Evidence, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 41 (1982); Jonakait, Will Blood Tell? Genetic
Markers in Criminal Cases, 31 EMORY L.J. 833 (1982); Jonakait, When Blood is Their Argument:
Probabilities in Criminal Cases, Genetic Markers, and, Once Again, Bayes' Theorem, 1983 U.
ILL. L. REv. 369 [hereinafter Jonakait, Probabilities]; Miller, Procedural Bias in Forensic Science
Examinations of Human Hair, 11 L. & HuM. Baxv. 157 (1987); Note, The Admissibility of
Electrophoretic Methods of Genetic Marker Bloodstain Typing Under the Frye Standard, 11
OKiLA. Crry U.L. R-v. 773 (1986); Note, Splitting Hairs in Criminal Trials: Admissibility of
Hair Comparison Probability Estimates, 1984 Agiz. ST. L.J. 521.
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of paternity." 1 7' This use of blood factor evidence has likewise provoked
scholarly literature.
7 2
In 1980 social scientists made their entry into the debate concerning
mathematics and the proof process. Two social scientists, Michael Saks and
Robert Kidd, examined many studies which showed systematic irrational
biases in human decisionmaking and concluded that the more structured and
rational approach to decisionmaking provided by traditional probabilistic
concepts could result in higher quality legal decisions. 7 3 These researchers
171. See, e.g., People v. Alzoubi, 133 II. App. 3d 806, 89 Ill. Dec. 202, 479 N.E.2d 1208
(1985); Davis v. State, 476 N.E.2d 127 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
172. Ellman & Kaye, Probabilities and Proof: Can HLA and Blood Group Testing Prove
Paternity?, 54 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 1131 (1979); Peterson, A Few Things You Should Know About
Paternity Tests (But Were Afraid to Ask), 22 SANTA CLARA L. Rav. 667 (1982); Reisner &
Bolk, A Layman's Guide to the Use of Blood Group Analysis in Paternity Testing, 20 J. F m.
L. 657 (1982); Shafer, supra note 37, at 810-814.
173. Saks & Kidd, supra note 5. Saks and Kidd did no research themselves, but they
provided a thorough review of the social science literature then available regarding human
decision making (principally that based on research of Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman).
Saks and Kidd then cataloged some major "heuristic [simplifying] biases", all of which speak
directly or indirectly to the usefulness of probabilistic evidence. The first heuristic-"represen-
tativeness"-arises when people attempt to connect two events by assessing the degree of
similarity between them. While for many purposes this is a useful strategy (when probability is
highly correlated with similarity), in many other cases it may lead to defects in judgment for
any of three reasons. First, people seem to be oblivious to the important role played by the
"prior probability" or "base rate" of the events occurring. Id. at 133. Second, people exhibit
an "insensitivity to sample size," failing to recognize that larger samples are more likely than
smaller samples to approximate the characteristics of the population from which they were
drawn. Id. at 134. Third, the "illusion of validity" describes the tendency of people to make
intuitive predictions by selecting the outcome that is more similar to their stereotype. For
example, given a brief personality description, people rely on their stereotypes and go from the
description, however meager, to the prediction. They do this even when informed ahead of
time about this propensity. Id. at 135.
A second heuristic explained by Saks and Kidd is entitled "availability." This refers to
the likelihood that people will judge the probability or frequency of an event based upon the
ease with which they can recall instances or occurrences of similar events. One effect of this is
that experiences which are bizarre or extreme are more likely to be remembered than common-
place events. Id. at 137, 139. Another effect is that expert witnesses who present statistical data
seem to have less impact on the jury than does a person who reports a case study, relates a
compelling personal experience, or offers anecdotal evidence. Id. at 137. Another availability
heuristic is called "illusory correlation." Here a person's estimates of two events occurring
together departs systematically from the evidence they actually experience. Id. at 139-40. People
perceive stereotypical correlations even though there is no evidence present for them, and this
prevents them from detecting relationships that are actually present.
A third heuristic pointed out by Saks and Kidd is entitled "adjustment and anchoring."
This heuristic simply demonstrates that when making certain types of judgments that require
revision, the revised result depends heavily upon the initial judgment and thus different initial
values often lead to quite different final estimates. Another aspect of "adjustment and anchor-
ing" are the "biases in the evaluation of conjunctive and disjunctive events." Id. at 140-41.
Here, people tend to overestimate the probability of the occurrence of conjunctive events and
to underestimate the probability of disjunctive events. Id. at 142.
A fourth heuristic is the tendency of people to undervalue probability data. Saks and Kidd
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did not even spare the sacred citadel erected by Professor Tribe in his "Trial
by Mathematics,' 74 asserting that it contained "a Swiss cheese of assump-
tions about human behavior-in this case human decision-making processes-
which are asserted as true simply because they fall within the wide reach of
the merely plausible, not because any evidence is adduced on their behalf."'17
The combination of the interest generated by the three books published
in the mid-1970s, the resurgence of appellate cases involving mathematical
issues, and the entrance by social scientists into the debate spurred continuing
activity by legal scholars. 76 This scholarly interest culminated in a symposium
at Boston University Law School in 1986 which spawned a book-length issue
of the Boston University Law Review containing contributions from most
of the leading scholars concerned with mathematics and the proof process.'7
Even this symposium, however, did not result in the final word on these
issues, as is evidenced by continuing scholarship in the field.171 Moreover,
assert:
Research demonstrates, however, that people do not process probabilistic information
well, that in the face of particularistic information, they cannot integrate the statistical
and anecdotal evidence and consequently tend to ignore the statistical information.
Intuitive, heuristic, human decision makers must dispense with certain information,
and that tends strongly to be the quantitative information.
Id. at 149.
Having pointed out these failings of human decisionmaking, Saks and Kidd conclude that
the legal system, like many other endeavors, should make use of mathematical tools as decision
aids:
It has been well established for some time now that when the same information is
available to intuitive humans or a good mathematical model, the human's decisions
are consistently less accurate... Even when mathematical tools are modeled after
human decision processes, the copy works better than the original... The mathe-
matical model of a person's own decision policies is more accurate than the person
because it consistently applies the same logic, while the human decision maker
fluctuates, being over-influenced by fortuitous, attention-catching pieces of informa-
tion that vary from time to time, and processing a too-limited set of variables.
Id. at 146-47. Thus, they conclude that, "[E]xperts ought to be permitted to offer their data,
their algorithms, and their Bayesian theorems," and more information regarding prior probability
should be admitted. Id. at 148.
174. See supra note 31.
175. See Saks & Kidd, supra note 5, at 125.
176. This scholarship includes, but is not limited to, Brook, supra note 39; Braun, supra
note 7; Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 16; Callen, supra note 29; Cohen, supra note 37;
Cohen, supra note 40; Eggleston, supra note 40; Jaffee, supra note 7; Kaye, supra note 32;
Kaye, supra note 166; Kaye, supra note 31; Kaye, supra note 49; Nesson, supra note 46; Tyree,
Probability Theory and the Law of Evidence, 1984 C iu. L.J. 224; Williams, supra note 28;
Williams, supra note 164; Williams, Rejoinder, supra note 28.
177. 66 B.U.L. REv. 377 (1986).
178. See Birmingham & Dunham, An Evidentiary Value Reading of Naked Statistical
Proofs, 31 ST. Louis U.L.J. 797 (1987); Jaffee, supra note 26; Kaye, supra note 13; Kaye,
supra note 7; Shaviro, supra note 39; Tillers & Schum, Charting New Territory in Judicial
Proof.- Beyond Wigmore, 9 C~ARozo L. REv. 907 (1988); Wright, supra note 36. A follow-up
conference to the one held at Boston University in 1986 is set for March 24-26, 1991, at the
Cardozo School of Law. The title of the conference is "Decision and Inference in Litigation."
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the findings of three significant social science research projects concerning
how factfinders deal with mathematical proof were published in the late
1980s.179 Meanwhile, by the mid-1980s prosecutors had become emboldened
to try more novel and Collins-like uses of probabilistic modes of proof. A
limited number of such attempts have been reported in appellate opinions,
but they are significant to the extent that they show that the urge still beats
within prosecutors' breasts to prove guilt through the creative use of prob-
abilities. 10 Two decades after Collins, then, there is a rich and complex
mixture of elements that has emerged at the intersection of mathematics and
the proof process. The last part of this article attempts to analyze the current
status of the five categories of mathematical evidence through an exposition
regarding the legal scholarship, case law, and social scientific research.
IV. ANALYZING TE ISSUES CONCERNING =H FrvE CATEGORIES OF
MATHEMATiCAL EVIDENCE
A. An Overview Of Categories and Their Interrelationships
The five categories of mathematical evidence are: (1) empirical statistics;
(2) probabilities of a random match (the classical theory analogue of category
one); (3) non-empirical probabilities of guilt incorporating empirical statistics
without Bayes' Theorem; (4) non-empirical probabilities of guilt developed
without empirical statistics and without Bayes' Theorem; and (5) non-
empirical probabilities of guilt incorporating empirical statistics via Bayes'
Theorem. One obviously key distinction that separates category four from
the others is that it is the only category that does not utilize empirical
statistics. The line separating empirical statistics from non-empirical data is
sometimes blurry, however. Some statistics, like bodily fluid "markers," are
obviously empirical because they are based on extensive empirical data. Some
data, like that used in People v. Collins, is obviously non-empirical. The
line tends to blur in the middle, however, because the skimpier the empirical
basis for the statistic, the less empirical the data looks. The rule of thumb
applied here for categorizing these issues is to place into the empirical
category those statistics with some plausible basis in empirical testing, and
to place into the non-empirical category those which are clearly and simply
made up (prosecutorial protests to the contrary notwithstanding). Once we
Participants include many of the persons whose work is cited in this article, including Ronald
Allen, L. Jonathan Cohen, Michael Finkelstein, David Kaye, Richard Lempert, David Schum,
Peter Tillers, Charles Nesson, Richard Friedman, Glenn Shafer, Lewis Kornhauser, and Lea
Brilmayer.
179. See Faigman & Baglioni, Bayes' Theorem in the Trial Process: Instructing Jurors on
the Value of Statistical Evidence, 12 L. & HuM. BEHAv. 1 (1988); Thompson & Schumann,
Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor's Fallacy and the
Defense Attorney's Fallacy, 11 L. & HuM. BEaHv. 167 (1987); Goodman, Probabilistic Scientific
Evidence: Jurors' Inferences 1986 (Doctoral Dissertation at the University of Washington,
available through UMI Dissertation Information Service).
180. For discussion of these cases, see infra notes 232-78 and accompanying text.
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conclude that a statistic is empirical, it is easy to tell whether it falls into
category one or another category, since category one is the only category
where the statistic is not used to form a probability. Similarly, category five
is easy to recognize because of the presence of Bayes' Theorem. Categories
two and three, however, provide another difficult question of categorization.
Both use probabilities formed from empirical statistics and neither uses
Bayes' Theorem. Further, when prosecutors use empirical statistics to form
probabilities they almost always argue that they are forming the probability
of a random match rather than a probability of guilt, undoubtedly because
courts are antipathetic towards probabilizing the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard. The rule of thumb that will be used herein to distribute
cases between categories two and three is as follows: If the probability of a
random match is such that there are a fair number of suspects other than
the defendant who have not been eliminated, the case will be discussed in
category two. If, on the other hand, the probability of a random match is
such that there is virtually no chance that any person other than the defendant
in the suspect population would match, then the case will be discussed in
category three.' 8'
Significantly, the great majority of scholarly writings regarding mathe-
matics in the proof process focus on the theoretical issues concerning the
probabilist and anti-probabilist positions-particularly on hypotheticals that
raise the issue of the sufficiency of naked statistics to support a verdict, and
the application of Bayes' Theorem to the proof process-while virtually
ignoring category one-empirical statistics not used probabilistically. But
category one usages in fact constitute the bulk of the case law. Thus, to a
great extent the interaction between the scholarship and case law surrounding
Collins are akin to the proverbial two ships passing in the night. One final
note is in order: the cases reviewed will be limited almost exclusively to
those that cite Collins. While other appellate opinions exist which address
mathematical issues, the cases citing Collins provide a fair cross-section of
the case law, and include virtually all of the more exotic uses of mathematical
evidence.
181. Two social science researchers recently noted, "No studies have systematically inves-
tigated individuals' differential use of varying degrees of statistical information." Faigman &
Baglioni, supra note 179, at 14. They went on to hypothesize, "Typically, researchers have used
modest ratios such as 80/20 or 70/30. It may be that individuals process probability figures by
giving some weight to extreme figures and little or no weight to modest figures, but do not
discriminate between the two in any refined manner." Id. These researchers were apparently
unaware of the doctoral thesis research conducted by Goodman, supra note 179, who did
systematically test reactions to differing levels of statistics. Goodman presented subjects with
the same nonmathematical evidence, but varied the inclusive/eliminative hard statistic among
subjects at four levels: 10%, 5%, 1%, and one-tenth of 1%. Id. at 103-04. Her findings at
least partially supported Faigman and Baglioni's hypothesis: the subjects seemed not to differ-
entiate regarding the weight to be assigned to the various levels. Id. at 133-35. Even Goodman's
one-tenth of 1% figure does not seem "extreme" however, since in a suspect population of
100,000 (which is what she used), it still leaves 100 suspects. Thus, Faigman and Baglioni's
hunch, shared by some courts, that jurors can be bowled over by extreme probabilities, remains
an unproven intuition.
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B. Category One: Empirical Statistics
This category consists of evidence based on empirically derived statistics
which are not used to form probabilities, but merely to show what portion
of the population is excluded as the culprit while the defendant is not. In
practice there is only one kind of evidence that prosecutors have used in
this manner: bodily fluid "marker" evidence. Such evidence usually elimi-
nates upwards of ninety-eight percent of the subject population. But assuming
a sizeable population in the area where the crime occurred, such evidence
leaves hundreds or even thousands of suspects other than the defendant.
This evidence raises three questions which will be discussed separately below:
(1) are the statistics valid; (2) are they relevant; (3) are they unfairly
prejudicial?
As to validity, for statistics to have any inclusive/eliminative effect they
must, of course, be valid statistics to begin with. "Validity" here means
that the statistics were obtained through an appropriate sampling technique
and that enough empirical data was obtained so that the generalizability of
the occurrence of the characteristic at issue over the entire population at
issue seems reasonable, i.e., that the there is a good probability that the rate
of occurrence within the sampled portion of the population continues at the
same proportion through the unsampled portion of the population. Further,
if two statistics are to be multiplied via the product rule to obtain a new
statistic regarding the coincidence of these two statistics, then there must be
a valid showing that the two factors are mutually independent.
Until relatively recently the only "marker" in human blood and semen
that prosecutors found helpful as evidence was the type of fluid found in
the ABO system. Such evidence has been common in criminal cases for
decades, but has only slight probative value because each of the four types
under that system is possessed by so many people that a showing of a match
between the defendant and the trace found at the scene (or the victim and
the trace found on the defendant), while eliminating a substantial portion
of the population, leaves a significant proportion of the population remaining
as possible culprits. In recent decades, however, scientists have discovered
an ever-increasing number of genetically controlled proteins and enzymes in
human cells (primarily blood and semen cells). Further, scientists have studied
various ethnic groups, both in this country and other countries, and have
cataloged the frequency of occurrence of many of these blood factors. They
have also sought to determine whether these factors' frequencies are inde-
pendent of each other in their occurrence, and have concluded that with
rare exceptions they are mutually independent. 2 2 These scientific advances
were quickly embraced by prosecutors as mechanisms by which to dramati-
182. Jonakait, Probabilities, supra note 170, at 375-77. However, studies have so far been
limited to tests for "pairwise independence." Three or more factors can be independent when
considered in pairs, yet still not be independent when considered in other combinations. Letter
from Professor Kaye to David McCord (May 15, 1990).
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cally narrow the population of possible suspects, sometimes to less than one
percent of the population of a particular ethnic group.
Defendants have challenged the scientific validity of such evidence. In
some jurisdictions which apply the Frye183 general acceptance standard the
evidence initially encountered some difficulties, primarily regarding whether
the scientific test (usually electrophoresis) used to test for genetic markers
was sufficiently reliable.IM Perhaps surprisingly, no court seems to have
undertaken a serious analysis whether the empirical database concerning the
occurrence and mutual independence of the particular factors were the result
of a valid and sufficient sampling procedure. Numerous courts have held,
without seemingly much inquiry into the validity of this database, that there
is a good foundation for the statistical rates of occurrence of blood factors.185
Many others assume a good foundation for the figures without even dis-
cussing the issue.'86 Even those courts that hold such evidence inadmissible
for unfair prejudice acknowledge the good foundation for use of these
statistics. 87 Some scholars have been less willing than most courts to accept
the validity of the empirical data underlying blood factor evidence. In one
of the first academic forays into the topic, Professor Jonakait expressed
substantial skepticism about the validity of the database even though he
came to the conclusion that the database was good enough:
Available research thus indicates that population frequency figures
cannot be treated as precise and that great care must be taken in
the interpretation of the products using the frequencies. This is
especially true when only a handful of markers is identified, or if
one of the markers is a rare phenotype. Nevertheless, data now exist
which form a reasonable basis on which to ascribe genetic marker
frequencies. The situation, therefore, is not like Collins. The prob-
abilities are not fanciful creations; instead they have a foundation
in the real world and may be verified scientifically. Because blood
genetic markers are statistically independent from each other, the
183. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
184. See, e.g., People v. Reilly, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 242 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1987); People
v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 709 P.2d 440, 220 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1985) (but the evidence was found
to pass the Frye test two years later); People v. Harbold, 124 Ill. App. 3d 363, 464 N.E.2d
734 (1984); People v. Young, 418 Mich. 1, 340 N.W.2d 805 (1983).
185. See, e.g., People v. Yorba, 209 Cal. App. 3d 1017, 257 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1989); Martinez
v. State, 549 So. 2d 694 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Stukey, 242 Kan. 204, 747 P.2d
137 (1987); Commonwealth v. Gomes, 403 Mass. 258, 526 N.E.2d 1270 (1988); State v. Woodall,
385 S.E.2d 253 (W.Va. 1989).
186. See, e.g., United States v. Gwaltney, 790 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1104 (1987); People v. Poggi, 45 Cal. 3d 306, 753 P.2d 1082, 246 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1988),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3261 (1989); People v. Morris, 199 Cal. App. 3d 377, 245 Cal. Rptr.
52 (1988); Graham v. State, 168 Ga. App. 23, 308 S.E.2d 413 (1983); People v. Prewitt, 160
Ill. App. 3d 942, 515 N.E.2d 977 (1987); State v. Rolls, 389 A.2d 824 (Me. 1978).
187. People v. Harbold, 124 Ill. App. 3d 363, 464 N.E.2d 734 (1984); State v. Carlson,
267 N.W.2d 170 (Minn. 1978).
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criticisms about the use of the product rule as in Collins do not
apply.
188
Professor Jaffee goes much further in attacking the validity of the empirical
database:
Genetic marker statistics, theories, and methods have been developed
around small, often unrandom and unsystematically obtained pop-
ulation samples, the more colorably valid studies having involved
only a few northwest European "Caucasian" populations. And this
will continue so, unless our privacies are to be severely invaded.
Therefore, we must question the genetic frequency figure's reliability
across various discrete populations. We do not know whether there
is a fair match between the population relevant to any American
case and those sampled. In fact, we can't ever know the relevant
population.
The HLA data available respecting American Blacks are far fewer
hence far less reliable. Many American Blacks are of "mixed stock,"
and in mixed-stock cases, genetic marker identification and frequency
are difficult even to estimate.
89
Despite these scholarly reservations, courts seem to be moving inexorably in
the direction of accepting the underlying statistical data's validity without
question.
As to relevance, prosecutors have a double-barreled argument regarding
such evidence. First, and most obviously, it places the defendant in a
relatively small class of persons who are not excluded from guilt. Second
and less obviously, the prosecution counts on this evidence reinforcing other
evidence in the case under the theory that the more pieces of evidence that
point toward the defendant, the less likely it is that the congruence is
coincidental. This is really a quite traditional usage of evidence which has
simply been made more precise by new technology and information. The
same theory underlies the admission of evidence in earlier times regarding
ABO blood type factors, and, analogously, testimony that the defendant's
hair is not inconsistent with a hair found at the scene; indeed, even non-
scientific testimony, such as that the defendant drove a white car as did the
culprit, or that the defendant was a Caucasian as was the culprit, is
traditionally used to build the case brick-by-brick. Not surprisingly, then,
bodily fluid "marker" evidence has never been held by a court to be irrelevant
(although one court has held its probabilistic analogue-the probability of a
random match-to be irrelevant). 190 Several courts have explicitly found such
188. Jonakait, Probabilities, supra note 170, at 381.
189. Jaffee, supra note 26, at 1025-26, 1049 (citations omitted).
190. See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
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evidence to be relevant. 19' More often, courts have found the evidence to
have been properly admitted without even discussing the question of rele-
vance, which indicates that either the defendant did not raise the relevance
objection or that the court was willing to assume relevance.192 A further
discussion of relevance is undertaken below in connection with the same
issue in category two.
As to unfair prejudice, the defense argument is that such evidence "will
be understood by the jury to be a quantification of the likelihood that the
defendant, who shares that unique combination of blood characteristics, is
guilty." a This language is derived from the only case to have held such
evidence to be unfairly prejudicial (although, again, several other courts have
held analogous probabilistic evidence in category two to be unfairly preju-
dicial).194 On the other hand, most courts have found such evidence not to
be unfairly prejudicial because the jury can understand the distinction
between statistics which exclude a portion of the population, and a probability
that the defendant is the guilty party out of the non-excluded portion of the
population. 9 A discussion of the merits of the debate regarding unfair
prejudice will be undertaken in connection with the closely related issue in
category two. 96
C. Category Two: Probabilities of a Random Match-The Classical
Probability Theory Analogue of Category One
Using an inclusive/eliminative hard statistic and adopting an assumption
that a random choice from a suspect population is equally likely to turn up
any individual, the classical theory of probability allows us to form the
probability of random match, that is, the probability that if we select a
person at random from the population, that person will have characteristics
that match the trace evidence connected with the crime. Thus, if we know
statistically that only two percent of the suspect population has certain bodily
191. See, e.g. People v. Poggi, 45 Cal. 3d 306, 753 P.2d 1082, 246 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1988),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3261 (1989); People v. Morris, 199 Cal. App. 3d 377, 245 Cal. Rptr.
52 (1988); Commonwealth v. Gomes, 403 Mass. 258, 526 N.E.2d 1270 (1988).
192. See, e.g., United States v. Gwaltney, 790 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1104 (1987); People v. Yorba, 209 Cal. App. 3d 1017, 257 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1989); Graham
v. State, 168 Ga. App. 23, 308 S.E.2d 413 (1983); People v. Redman, 135 II. App. 3d 534,
481 N.E.2d 1272 (1985); Davis v. State, 476 N.E.2d 127 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Stukey,
242 Kan. 204, 747 P.2d 137 (1987); State v. Thompson, 503 A.2d 689 (Me. 1986); State v.
Woodall, 385 S.E.2d 253 (W.Va. 1989); State v. Hartman, 145 Wis. 2d 1, 426 N.W.2d 320
(1988).
193. State v. Joon Kyu Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544, 548 (Minn. 1987). See also Tribe, supra
note 31, at 1355.
194. See infra notes 199 and 209-10 and accompanying text.
195. See, e.g., United States v. Gwaltney, 790 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1104; People v. Redman, 135 Ill. App. 3d 534, 481 N.E.2d 1272 (1985); People v. Alzoubi,
133 Ill. App. 3d 806, 479 N.E.2d 1208 (1985); Davis v. State, 476 N.E.2d 127 (Ind. Ct. App.
1985); State v. Woodall, 385 S.E.2d 253 (W.Va. 1989).
196. See infra notes 215-30 and accompanying text.
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fluid "markers," we can state that the probability of randomly selecting a
person from the suspect population with those bodily fluid "markers" is
one-fiftieth. This second category consists of probabilities formed in such a
manner (with the caveat that the probabilities must be such as to leave a
fair number of suspects other than the defendant in the suspect population-
if they do not, then they fall into category three). Two kinds of evidence-
bodily fluid "markers" and hair comparisons-are found in this category.
Each type of evidence raises issues of validity, relevance and unfair preju-
dice. 97
With respect to bodily fluid "markers," most of the cases in this category
involve sex offense prosecutions where the alleged victim became pregnant
and delivered a child as a result of the allegedly illegal sexual activity. The
prosecutor uses markers in the blood of the child and compares them with
markers from the mother and the alleged father to calculate one or both of
two probabilities. One probability is the probability of a random match
calculation (known in the paternity area as the "probability of exclusion")
which states what portion of the male population could have contributed
genetic material containing the requisite factors. The second probability
calculation is called the "paternity index" and is based on the fact that
within a group of men genetically capable of fathering a child with certain
genetic factors, some will be more genetically likely to have done so than
others. 98 This probability cannot be calculated as to trace evidence left at
the scene, since within the group of persons with such "markers," each is
assumed equally likely to have left the trace. The paternity index, then, is a
ratio that compares the alleged father's likelihood of producing the child's
phenotypes with the likelihood of a randomly selected man doing so. Thus,
the "paternity index" is more discriminating than the "probability of exclu-
sion."
Courts have not questioned the validity of the underlying statistics in
these paternity cases; indeed, the statistics are based on the same data as
empirical statistics in category one. Of the few courts- that have considered
197. Recall the dual import of inclusive/eliminative hard statistics-their inclusive/elimi-
native effect, and their tendency to show that the evidence in the case is not merely pointing
coincidentally toward the defendant. When a prosecutor turns the hard statistics into the
probability of a random match, the prosecutor is seeking to highlight the "not just a coincidence"
effect of the evidence even further.
198. See Plemel v. Walter, 303 Or. 262, 269, 735 P.2d 1209, 1213-14 (1987) where the
following example is given:
For example, we noted above that Walter's phenotype for the ABO system was A2B
and that the child's father had to have one of the "B phenotypes". Walter could
transmit to his child either his A2 or his B gene. The chance that he would transmit
the B gene would be 50 percent. A man who had a B phenotype and two B genes
(as opposed to a man with a B phenotype and one B gene and one 0 gene), however,
would have a 100 percent chance of transmitting a B gene. Other things being equal,
this man would be more likely to be the father of Plemel's child than would be
Walter.
Id. at 269, 735 P.2d at 1214.
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the "probability of exclusion", all but one have found it to be relevant and
not unfairly prejudicial.199 One other case involving a blood trace not in the
context of a paternity issue also found a probability of a random match to
be unfairly prejudicial due to the confusion that might exist for the jury
between that probability and the probability of the defendant's guilt. 
2
W
With respect to hair comparison evidence, testimony by experts that
characteristics of two specimens of hair "were consistent with" each other
had been used in courts for decades prior to Collins. It was not until the
mid-1970s, however, that forensic scientists sought to establish any statistics
concerning the occurrence of common characteristics among strands of hair.
The Canadian Royal Mounted Police did two studies, one for scalp hair and
one for pubic hair, in which researchers selected hairs from different people
and then determined the probability of a match between hairs picked at
random.20' These studies determined that there was a one in 4500 probability
of a random match between the scalp hair of two different persons and a
one in 800 chance regarding pubic hair. Commentators have launched several
telling blows at the validity of these figures.202 These objections include the
subjective nature of hair comparison, the fact that the examiners' subjective
determinations may have been affected by their knowledge that no hairs
should match, that the use of characteristics that are not significant in
distinguishing the hairs of different people may have biased the results of
the study, that the matches between pairs of hairs were not statistically
independent, and that the study population was very small and not selected
at random.23 But two objections are particularly telling. First, the probability
estimate was merely an average of the probability over all cases. Unlike
bodily fluid "markers," the hair comparison figures failed to reflect the
relative rarity or frequency of the combination of hair characteristics exhib-
ited by one individual compared to the rest of the population.2 The studies
recognized that some types of hair were "common and featureless" and that
they occurred with relatively more frequency in the population than hairs
with more singular characteristics. Thus, as to a "common and featureless"
199. In the majority are People v. Alzoubi, 133 IlL. App. 3d 806, 479 N.E.2d 1208 (1985);
Davis v. State, 476 N.E.2d 127 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Jackson, 320 N.C. 452, 358
S.E.2d 679 (1987); State v. Hartman, 145 Wis. 2d 1, 426 N.W.2d 320 (1988). In the minority
is State v. Boyd, 331 N.W.2d 480 (Minn. 1983) (too much danger of jury confusing probability
of a random match with probability of guilt). See also a civil case, Commonwealth v. Beausoleil,
397 Mass. 206, 490 N.E.2d 788 (1986) ("probability of exclusion" while possibly relevant is of
very little probative value because it does not pinpoint which person within the nonexcluded
group of suspects is the father).
200. People v. Harbold, 124 IU. App. 3d 363, 464 N.E.2d 734 (1984).
201. See Gaudette & Keeping, supra note 168; Gaudette, supra note 168.
202. See, e.g., Barnett & Ogle, supra note 170; Miller, supra note 170; Robertson, An
Appraisal of the Use of Microscopic Data in the Examination of Human Head Hair, 22 J.
FORENSIC Sci. Soc'Y 390 (1982); Note, Splitting Hairs in Criminal Trials: Admissibility of Hair
Comparison Probability Estimates, 1984 ARiz. ST. L.J. 521 [hereinafter Note, Splitting Hairs].
203. These objections are summarized in Note, Splitting Hairs, supra note 202, at 529-33.
204. Id. at 534-35.
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hair, the one in forty-five hundred or one in eight hundred figure would far
overstate the rarity of the existence of other possible culprits. Second, the
studies determined the probability of a match given that hairs are not from
the same person, when the issue in criminal trials is almost always the logical
converse, i.e., with respect to hairs that have already been shown to match,
what is the probability that the hairs came from different people?2°' 5 While
these two figures can be related through Bayes' Theorem, they are not the
same. To calculate the probability that would be pertinent in a criminal case,
one would also have to know the probability of two hairs matching given
that they come from the same person, a figure not provided by the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police studies.20 Only if the chances of a match between
hairs picked at random from the same person were greater than one in 4500
or one in 800 would the evidence tend to inculpate the defendant.2n While
one suspects that there is a substantially greater probability of a match
between two hairs selected at random from the same person, forensic
scientists admit that even hairs from the same person can exhibit quite a
range of characteristics. For all of these reasons, the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police studies are fatally flawed.
Four appellate decisions have considered the admissibility of expert
testimony based upon the Canadian Royal Mounted Police studies. Surpris-
ingly, none of the opinions seriously discussed the validity of the studies,
although one opinion held that expert testimony referring to those studies
had been improperly admitted because the witness knew little about the
studies and thus could not provide a foundation from which the trial court
could have concluded that the studies were valid. 20' One opinion, in fact,
found that the probabilities were "based upon empirical scientific data of
unquestioned validity."' ' That court, however, along with one other, 210 held
that the probabilities were improperly admitted because of their potential
for unfairly prejudicing the defendant by influencing the jury to equate the
probability of a random match with the probability of guilt.
With respect to the relevance of evidence in categories one and two,
then, while one court has held the evidence to be irrelevant, by far the bulk
of authority is in favor of admission. As far as this author can tell, no anti-
probabilist scholars would argue against the relevance of empirical statistics.
21'
205. Note, Admissibility of Mathematical Evidence in Criminal Trials, 21 AM. Cane. L.
REv. 55, 65-66 (1983).
206. Id. at 66.
207. Id.
208. United States v. Massey, 594 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1979).
209. State v. Carlson, 267 N.W.2d 170, 176 (1978). Lest we be too harsh on this court,
note that none of the critiques of Gaudette & Keeping's work cited supra in note 168 had yet
been published when this case was decided.
210. Brown v. State, 751 P.2d 1078 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988).
211. The closest is Professor Leonard Jaffee who characterizes eliminative evidence as
requiring a "double negative inference" and contends that no number of such double negative
inferences accumulated can combine with one another to substitute for "actualistic" proof. See
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The bulk of authority clearly reaches the correct result as to category one.
Inclusive/eliminative evidence, including empirical statistics, have long been
recognized to be relevant because they eliminate a substantial number of
possible culprits without exculpating the defendant. 21 2 Indeed, the one holding
of People v. Collins that has been challenged effectively concerns this very
issue. Recall that the fourth basis for a reversal in Collins was that even
assuming the statistics had been valid, "[The most a mathematical compu-
tation could ever yield would be a measure of the probability that a random
couple would possess the distinctive features in question .... Urging that
the Collinses be convicted on the basis of evidence which logically establishes
no more than this seems as indefensible as arguing for the conviction of X
on the ground that a witness saw either X or X's twin commit the crime." 213
Recall also that the issue before the court was the admissibility of the
probabilities and the prosecutor's argument based thereon, not the sufficiency
of the evidence to convict. Thus, the excerpt just quoted can either be viewed
as an unnecessary excursus on sufficiency, or as an implied holding that the
probability of a random match was irrelevant. If the latter interpretation is
what the court meant, then the court's own illustration shows the reasoning
to be incorrect. While certainly the court is correct that eyewitness testimony
that either X or X's twin committed a crime would not be sufficient alone
to convict X of the crime, such testimony would certainly be relevant since
it pares the possible suspect pool from the population of the world down
to two. California courts in later cases involving empirical statistics have
simply ignored this aspect of Collins.
21 4
With respect to unfair prejudice regarding evidence in categories one
and two, the majority of courts have rejected this objection, while a few
have found too great a danger of the jury's confusing the empirical statistics
or a probability of a random match based thereon with the probability of
the defendant's guilt. One recent social science study has been conducted on
this exact point,215 and a second, broader study also reached some conclusions
Jaffee, supra note 7, at 1063-64. While Jaffee's illustration in the article just cited does not
deal with hard statistical data, Professor Jaffee acknowledged in a conversation with the author
that he would indeed extend his analysis to include inclusive/eliminative hard statistics.
212. Indeed, if such inclusive/eliminative hard statistics are deemed to be so precise as to
narrow the category of suspects to one, the issue of probability does not even arise. Fingerprints
are the one traditional kind of evidence viewed in this manner. Another recent contender for
this honor is "DNA fingerprinting" which claims to be able to identify patterns of genetic
characteristics that are unique to each individual. Such evidence has been approved by appellate
courts in Florida. See Martinez v. State, 549 So. 2d 694 (Fla. Dist. App. 1989). See also
Williams, DNA Fingerprinting: A Revolutionary Technique in Forensic Science and Its Probable
Impacts on Criminal Evidentiary Law, 37 DAx L. REv. 1 (1987-88).
213. People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 331, 438 P.2d 33, 40-41, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497, 504-
05 (1968). See discussion on this point supra note 130.
214. See, e.g., People v. Poggi, 45 Cal. 3d 306, 753 P.2d 1082, 246 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1988),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3261 (1989); People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 709 P.2d 440, 220 Cal.
Rptr. 637 (1985); People v. Yorba, 209 Cal. App. 3d 1017, 257 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1989); People
v. Morris, 199 Cal. App. 3d 377, 245 Cal. Rptr. 52 (1988).
215. Thompson & Schumann, supra note 179.
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on this point.2 6 The results of the first study (the "Thompson and Schu-
mann" study) are illuminating. Thompson and Schumann's first experiment
involved 144 volunteers from a pool of university students. Each was initially
given the same non-mathematical evidence regarding the identity of a person
who robbed a liquor store, i.e., that the store clerk was able to describe the
robber's height, weight, and clothing, but could not see his face or hair.
The police apprehended the suspect near the store who matched the clerk's
description but the suspect did not have the ski mask or the stolen money.
The police found those items in a trash can near where the suspect was
apprehended, however. At that point, the experiment subjects were asked to
make an initial estimate of the probability of the suspect's guilt. Each of
the subjects was then given mathematically-phrased expert testimony con-
cerning hair comparison, with the evidence presented in one form to part
of the subjects and in another form to the other subjects. The first form
was an empirical statistic, i.e., that in the city of one million people, two
percent have hair that would be indistinguishable from that of the defendant
and thus that there were approximately 20,000 people in the suspect popu-
lation with hair consistent with that found inside the ski mask that was
worn by the robber during the robbery. The other half of the subject pool
was given testimony stating that there is "only a two percent chance a
defendant's hair would be indistinguishable from that of the perpetrator if
he were innocent. . .," i.e., testimony in the form of probability of a random
match. After reading the forensic evidence each of the subjects made a final
judgment of the probability of the suspect's guilt. The researchers found
that 13.2 percent of the subjects estimated the probability of guilt to be
exactly ninety-eight percent, which is the probability obtained by subtracting
the probability of a random match figure from one. The researchers con-
cluded that these subjects were victims of "the Prosecutor's Fallacy," that
is, that they had been induced to equate the probability of a random match
with the probability of the suspect's guilt. On the other hand, 12.5 percent
of the respondents did not change their probability of guilt before the
forensic evidence to a higher probability afterwards, indicating that they gave
no weight whatsoever to the forensic evidence. The researchers concluded
that these subjects were victims'of "the Defense Attorney's Fallacy," that
is, that those subjects viewed the mutually supportive aspects of the non-
mathematical evidence and the mathematical evidence as merely coincidental
and having little or no probative value. These persons seemingly gave great
weight to the proposition that the evidence only showed that the defendant
was one of 20,000 persons who could have committed the crime. The
characterization by the researchers of this reasoning as a "fallacy" betrays
them as probabilists. Indeed, they claim that the evidence is really highly
probative because Bayesian analysis so shows. An anti-probabilist, of course,
would say that the line of reasoning which gives little weight to such evidence
216. Goodman, supra note 179.
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is perfectly legitimate and praiseworthy and not a "fallacy" at all.217 Without
taking sides, for purposes of convenience in discussing this research we will
adopt the name-"Defense Attorney's Fallacy"-used by the researchers.
The researchers classified the remaining 74.3 percent of the subjects as
victims of neither fallacy, because their final judgments of guilt were higher
than their initial judgments but less than ninety-eight percent. 218 The incidence
of occurrence of each fallacy was directly related to whether the subject had
received the testimony in the form of empirical statistics or the probability
of a random match. Of the nineteen persons who fell prey to the prosecutor's
fallacy, sixteen of them had read the probability of a random match form
of the evidence, while only three had read the empirical statistics form. Of
the eighteen people who fell prey to the defense attorney's fallacy, only six
had read the probability of a random match form of the evidence, while
the remaining twelve had read the empirical statistics form.
219
In their second experiment, Thompson and Schumann gave seventy-three
undergraduate subjects a description of a murder case in which the killer's
identity was unknown, but the victim was known to have wounded the killer
with a knife. The police found some of the killer's blood at the crime scene
and tests indicated that it was a rare type found in only one person in 100.
While questioning the victim's neighbors, a detective noticed that one of
them was wearing a bandage. Based on his impression of this man, the
detective estimated the probability of his guilt to be ten percent. Later the
detective received the information that this suspect had the same rare blood
type as the blood of the killer found at the crime scene. The subject's task
was to decide whether the detective should revise his estimate of the prob-
ability of the suspect's guilt in light of the new evidence, and if so, by how
much. Subjects were given two brief arguments to read, one embodying the
Prosecutor's Fallacy and the other the Defense Attorney's Fallacy. The
217. Thompson & Schumann, supra note 179, at 171. For the anti-probabilists, here is
Prof. Wright: "The fact that judges, jurors, and lay persons ignore the base rates and instead
focus on the particularistic evidence is, contrary to the assertions of the Bayesians, highly
rational." Wright, supra note 36, at 1062.
218. Thompson & Schumann, supra note 179, at 173.
219. Goodman, supra note 179, studied the impact on mock jurors of different phrasings
of the mathematical evidence in another manner. Working with a pool of prospective jurors
on call at the King County Superior Court in Seattle, she presented them with a transcript of
an arson case where an expert testified that gas found at the scene matched gas found in the
defendant's alleged accomplice's car. Id. at 148. In one variation, some of the subjects received
the expert testimony in terms of the odds of a random match, i.e., the odds that the gas would
match by chance was 1/1000. In the other variation, the rest of the subjects received the
testimony in terms of the percentage likelihood of a random match, i.e., the chance of a
random match was one-tenth of 1%. Id. at 151. In other words, whereas Thompson and
Schumann tested the difference between inclusive/exclusive hard statistics and the probability
of a random match, Goodman tested the difference between two phrasings of the probability
of a random match. Goodman's conclusions were correspondingly less dramatic: the two groups
came to virtually identical estimates of guilt, with the only difference being that the odds group
was slightly less confident of its judgment, presumably because odds are a less-well-known and
understood concept than percentages. Id. at 183-84.
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subjects were not given both arguments at once, however; instead, half of
the subjects first received the prosecution argument and half first received
the defense argument. After reading the first argument the subjects were
asked three questions: first, whether they believed the logic and reasoning
of the argument was correct; second, whether they thought the detective
should revise his estimate of the suspect's probable guilt in light of the blood
type evidence; and third, what they thought the detective's estimate of the
probability of guilt should be in light of the blood type evidence. The
subjects were then given the other argument and asked to answer the same
three questions. As to whether each argument was correct, fifty subjects
(68.5 percent) labeled the argument consistent with the Defense Attorney's
Fallacy as correct, while twenty-one (28.8 percent) found the argument
consistent with the Prosecutor's Fallacy to be correct. Only sixteen subjects
(22.2 percent) found both arguments to be incorrect. The order in which the
arguments were presented did not significantly affect the ratings regarding
correctness.3 With respect to the responses to questions regarding to what
extent, if any, the detective should revise his estimate of guilt in view of the
blood type evidence, only four responses (three percent) were consistent with
the respondents' having bought into the Prosecutor's Fallacy, while eighty-
two of the responses (56 percent) were consistent with the Defense Attorney's
Fallacy. Also of interest is the fact that slightly over one-fifth of the
respondents gave inconsistent answers, i.e., one response after reading the
first argument consistent with one fallacy and another response after reading
the second argument consistent with the other fallacy.?'
Three conclusions can be drawn from the Thompson and Schumann
experiments, although they must remain quite tentative in view of the
relatively small number of subjects tested and the fact that the setting was
not a real trial context. First, many people do not understand mathematics
with any level of sophistication, or perhaps at all. As Thompson and
Schumann concluded:
These experiments indicate that people are not very good at drawing
correct inferences from associative evidence and incidence rate sta-
tistics. They are strongly influenced by subtle and logically incon-
sequential differences in how these statistics are presented. They are
unable to see the error in crude arguments for fallacious interpre-
tations of the evidence, and their judgments of probable guilt are
strongly influenced by such arguments.2m
Second, presenting evidence in the form of probability of a random match
is more likely to cause subjects to confuse that probability with the probability
220. Thompson & Schumann, supra note 179, at 178.
221. Id. at 179.
222. Id. at 181. See also Goodman, supra note 179. "Most mock-jurors have little facility
with probabilities, and were unable to convert odds to percentages and vice versa.. . ." Id. at
203.
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of the defendant's guilt than when evidence is presented in the form of
empirical statistics. Third, while Thompson and Schumann found it to be
unclear why the Prosecutor's Fallacy was less prevalent in the second
experiment than in the first, the most likely conclusion is that people who
are initially amenable to the Prosecutor's Fallacy when it is unrebutted, as
in experiment one, can fairly easily see the error of their ways when a
contrary defense argument is presented, as in experiment two. Thus, there
is good reason to hope that a minimal percentage of jurors would buy into
the Prosecutor's Fallacy if a competent defense attorney explained to them
why they should not do so.
In a similar study in 1986 ,22 Goodman reached conclusions that are
consistent with the findings of Thompson and Schumann, except in one
respect. Goodman used as subjects 233 undergraduate psychology majors.
She presented them with information regarding a murder case where one of
the items of evidence against the defendant was that the defendant's blood
type matched a blood trace at the crime scene, and it was established that
the trace could not have come from the victim. Some subjects were presented
with testimony that the blood type found at the scene was possessed by ten
percent of the population; some that the blood type was possessed by five
percent of the population, some that it was possessed by one percent of the
population, and some that it was possessed by one-tenth of one percent of
the population. All subjects were informed that the suspect population
consisted of 100,000 persons. 22A The subjects were then required to answer
questions concerning their evaluations of the case. Goodman reached three
conclusions from this data that corroborate the Thompson and Schumann
results: (1) the subjects were very bad at manipulating the numbers-many
were unable to calculate how many persons in the suspect population would
have the blood type found at the scene;22 (2) the subjects "underutilized"
the evidence compared with what Bayes' Theorem would suggest; 2 6 and (3)
the incidence of the Prosecutor's Fallacy was rare (1.6 percent). 227 She reached
one conclusion somewhat inconsistent with Thompson and Schumann: she
found that the incidence of the Defense Attorney's Fallacy was not as
widespread as Thompson and Schumann found. 228 Goodman's study also
allowed her to reach one conclusion about which Thompson and Schumann's
study was silent-she found that the subjects treated the mathematical
evidence as being of virtually equal weight no matter which of the four
statistics the subject received. Thus, the group that received the ten percent
figure (which would leave 10,000 possible suspects), gave the evidence the
same weight as the group that received the one-tenths of one percent (which
223. See Goodman, supra note 179.
224. Id. at 101-104.
225. Id. at 131-32.
226. Id. at 134-35.
227. Id. at 132-33.
228. Id. at 133-34.
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would leave only 100 possible suspects).3 9 Goodman concluded, "[Tihe
student mock-jurors were insensitive to the variations ... or, alternatively,
... they found it difficult to accord appropriate weight to probabilistic
evidence.' "o
The teaching of the social science studies on the issue of unfair prejudice
is clear (albeit tentative): valid empirical statistics are relevant and not unfairly
prejudicial, assuming competent defense counsel. Probabilities of a random
match, though, while relevant, are unfairly prejudicial because they do not
add any information not already provided by the empirical statistics, but do
have a significant potential for causing the jury to engage in an inappropriate
line of reasoning.
D. Probabilities of Guilt
1. Category Three: Non-Empirical Probabilities of Guilt Incorporating
Empirical Statistics Without Bayes' Theorem
Evidence in this category is characterized by the utilization of empirical
statistics being phrased in terms of probability of a random match, with the
probability being so miniscule that it virtually leaves no other suspect in the
world besides the defendant. Prosecutors always argue that such evidence is
not really being used to convince the jury to subjectively probabilize the
guilt calculation, but rather is simply being used nonprobabilistically to
exclude all possible alternatives inconsistent with guilt. This nonprobabilistic
argument rings true with an item of evidence like a fingerprint, which is
based on the truly empirical statistic that no two individuals have identical
fingerprints. Fingerprint evidence is virtually never used probabilistically.23
Rather, it is used as the ultimate empirical statistic. But the cases that are
included in this category are not based on statistics that are nearly as
empirical as those underlying fingerprints. Indeed, it was often a close call
whether the cases in this category should instead be placed in category four,
as involving non-empirical statistics. The statistics underlying probability
calculations in category three cases obviously are built on shaky foundations
and have high probabilities of error. Further, the expert testimony in each
case could well have been presented nonprobabilistically, yet the prosecution
reached to create probabilities. This indicates that the prosecution in these
cases probably was seeking to induce the jury to reason probabilistically to
guilt, rather than to simply eliminate in a nonprobabilistic fashion alternatives
inconsistent with guilt.
229. Id. at 133-35.
230. Id. at 135.
231. But see Hicks v. Scurr, 671 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1982) (fingerprint expert unable to
find sufficient points for comparison to make a clear match, but testified there was a one in
seven million chance of a random match. The court held the testimony to have been properly
admitted.); Commonwealth v. Drayton, 386 Mass. 39, 434 N.E.2d 997 (1982) (fingerprint expert
testified that there was a one in 387 trillion chance of a random match. The court held it was
error to state the fingerprint testimony probabilistically, but held that the error was harmless.).
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There are only six cases in this category, but each is factually interesting,
and taken together they are legally significant because they stand in stark
contrast to Collins. Unlike Collins, courts in five of the six of these cases
seem not to be much concerned with the validity of the underlying statistics,
or, where the product rule was applied, with the mutual independence of
the statistics. None of the courts in these six cases seem particularly worried
about the probabilistic evidence having the effect of probabilizing the "be-
yond a reasonable doubt" burden of persuasion, nor that jurors will be
unfairly prejudiced to equate the probability of a random match with the
probability of guilt. In short, these cases show a distinct tendency toward
adopting the probabilist position. The cases will be discussed in chronological
order.
The 1969 New Hampshire case of State v. Coolidge,23 2 is the only
significant probabilistic evidence case to be decided in the decade subsequent
to Collins. There, to prove that the defendant had been at the crime scene,
an expert testified concerning particle matches obtained by vacuuming the
victim's clothing and vacuuming the defendant's clothes and automobile.
Out of a visual comparison of the sweepings, the expert selected for com-
parison forty particles from the victim's clothing with forty particles obtained
from the defendant's clothes and automobile. The expert found twenty-seven
matching pairs among the forty pairs of particles. He then testified that
based upon previous studies made by him, the probability of finding similar
particles in sweepings from different places was one in ten, that each matching
set was independent from any other, and that thus the probability of finding
twenty-seven similar particles and sweepings from independent sources was
only one in ten to the twenty-seventh power. 233 In one sentence, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court held that any objections to this testimony went
to weight rather than its admissibility. 23 The court thus demonstrated a near
complete lack of concern with the validity of the database upon which the
expert based his testimony, as well as with the mutual independence of
matches. Further, as two critiques pointed out, the court seemed oblivious
to the fact that the expert's math was drastically wrong:
Specifically, he failed to consider in his probability statement the
number of samples that he examined in order to find twenty-seven
matching particles. That number is an essential ingredient in any
probability statement of this nature. If, for example, three hundred
independent pairs of samples had been examined, with a probability
of similarity of 1/10 for each pair, we would expect about thirty
matching pairs. A finding of only twenty-seven pairs would argue
against physical contact between defendant and the victim. 2 5
232. 109 N.H. 403, 260 A.2d 547 (1969), rev'd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
233. State v. Coolidge, 109 N.H. 403, 418-19, 260 A.2d 547, 558-59 (1969), rev'd on other
grounds, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
234. Id. at 419, 260 A.2d at 559.
235. Broun & Kelly, supra note 7, at 47. See also Tribe, supra note 31, at 1342:
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Despite these defects, Coolidge's conviction was upheld.
In the 1978 Arizona case of State v. Garrison,216 the defendant was
charged with first degree murder. The prosecution called a dentist who
testified that there was an eight in one million probability that bite marks
found on the deceased's body were not made by the defendant. The doctor
based the figure on unspecified articles and books in the medical field.
2 7
The Arizona Supreme Court cavalierly accepted the validity of the foundation
undergirding the probability figure and upheld the conviction.28 A blistering
and convincing dissent showed the probability to be without foundation and
thus unfairly prejudicial. 2 9
The third case in this category, the 1983 Georgia decision in Williams
v. State, ° involved prosecution of the defendant for a notorious series of
slayings of black children in Atlanta. Some of the key evidence against
Williams came from alleged matches between carpet fibers found on several
of the victims and the carpeting in Williams' car and home. As to the
carpeting in Williams' car, two forensic experts testified that they had received
information from General Motors that only 620 out of over two million
cars in the Atlanta area had the kind of carpeting found on the floorboard
of Williams' 1970 Chevrolet station wagon. 241 It was unexplained how General
Motors, which presumably could only know how many such cars it had
shipped to the Atlanta area, could know how many such cars there actually
were in that area given that cars are objects which are frequently moved,
traded, sold or junked. As to the carpeting in Williams' home, the manu-
facturer was not so obliging as to provide an exact figure concerning how
many homes in the Atlanta area had that kind of carpeting. Undeterred by
this lack of a reliable database, the creative prosecutor, through an investi-
Most significantly, the court was evidently unaware that the relevant probability of
finding 27 or more matches out of 40 attempts, was very much larger than 1/10 to
the 27th-larger in fact, by a factor of approximately 1010. Indeed, even the forty
particles chosen for comparison were visually selected for similarity from a still larger
set of particle candidates-so large a set, conceivably, that the probability of finding
27 more matches in sweeping over such a large sample even from 2 entirely different
sources, could well have been as high as 1/2 or more.
Id. n.40.
236. 120 Ariz. 255, 585 P.2d 563 (1987).
237. State v. Garrison, 120 Ariz. 255, 258, 585 P.2d 563, 566 (1987).
238. Id. at 258-59, 585 P.2d at 566-67.
239. Id. at 260-63, 585 P.2d 563, 568-71 (Gordon, J., dissenting).
Bite mark evidence is not usually phrased in probabilistic form but rather is offered under
the theory that each person's dentition is unique. While courts almost always uphold the
admissibility of bite mark evidence, it has been convincingly argued that there is no empirical
data to support any probability of a random match or that each person's dentition is unique.
See Wilkinson & Gerughty, Bite Mark Evidence: Its Admissibility Is Hard to Swallow, 12 W.
ST. U.L. REv. 519 (1985).
240. 251 Ga. 749, 312 S.E.2d 40 (1983). The probabilistic aspects of this case are set forth
much more clearly in a law review note than they are in the appellate opinion itself. See Note,
The Odds of Criminal Justice in Georgia: Mathematically Expressed Probabilities in Georgia
Criminal Trials, I GA. ST. L. REv. 131 (1984).
241. Williams v. State, 251 Ga. 749, 824, 312 S.E.2d 40, 98 (1983) (Smith, J., dissenting).
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gator, proceeded to create a statistic using a bare minimum of data and an
abundance of assumptions. Briefly, the methodology followed by the pros-
ecutor and investigator was as follows. They obtained from the carpeting
manufacturer information that during 1971 and 1972 the combined sales of
the brand of carpeting found in Williams' home and another brand was
slightly over 16,000 square yards in a ten-state region including Georgia.
Then assuming that twenty square yards was a reasonable amount of carpet
for an average room, they concluded that approximately 820 rooms in the
ten-state region contained such carpeting. Assuming that these rooms were
equally distributed throughout the ten-state area, the expert concluded that
there were likely to be eighty-two such rooms in Georgia. The prosecution
then indulged in two assumptions that were "very, very beneficial to the
defense," namely that each house containing such carpeting had only one
room carpeted with it, and that all of the rooms to be found in Georgia
were in the Atlanta area. Then, using a figure for the number of homes in
the Atlanta area obtained from the Atlanta Regional Commission, the
investigator calculated that the odds of randomly selecting a home containing
carpeting similar to that in Williams' were one in 7792. 242 In closing argument,
then, the prosecutor applied the coup de grace. First, he argued that "there
would be only one chance in eight thousand that there would be another
house in Atlanta that would have the same kind of carpeting as the Williams
home."' ' 3 This, of course, was a drastic misstatement concerning the expert
testimony since it had "established" that there were eighty-one other homes
in the Atlanta area containing such carpeting, and thus the probability of
another such home was in fact one, not one in eight thousand.2 The
prosecutor then reminded the jury that only about 600 cars of the two and
one-half million in the Atlanta area had carpeting similar to Williams' station
wagon, and then inexplicably figured the odds of choosing such a car at
random to be about one in 5000.245 Then, assuming that the occurrence of
the carpeting in the 620 cars and the carpeting in the eighty-two homes were
mutually independent, he used the product rule to multiply the one in 5000
probability of a random matching car with a one in 8000 probability of a
matching random house to arrive at the conclusion that there was a one in
forty million chance that a random selection would turn up a person who
owned both such a car and such a house.? Not satisfied with this figure,
the prosecutor then stated that it would be more realistic to assume that a
homeowner using that particular carpeting would probably carpet at least
four rooms with it, and thus the probability of a random match was more
like one in 150 million?"7 The Georgia Supreme Court in one sentence
242. See Note, supra note 240, at 141.
243. Id. at 150.
244. Id. at 150-51.
245. Id. at 151-52. Actually using the prosecution's figures of 620 such cars and 2.5 million
cars in the Atlanta area, the probability of picking such a car at random would be one in 4032.
246. Id. at 152.
247. Id.
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approved of this prosecution approach, stating that inferences suggested to
the jury "may include those based on probabilities."'A 8 The Georgia Supreme
Court thus appears oblivious to the problems concerning the validity of the
underlying statistics, their mutual independence, and the tendency of this
probabilistic evidence to probabilize the "beyond a reasonable doubt" stan-
dard.
In the 1984 Alaska case of Huf v. State, 9 the prosecution sought to
prove that hairs found in a cap left at the scene of a sexual assault belonged
to the defendant. It called an FBI agent who testified that during the last
seven years he had performed about 10,000 examinations of the hair of
roughly 10,000 different people, and on only two occasions had he found
hair from two people so similar that it could not be distinguished. He also
testified that head hair and pubic hair are "two independent events."'' 0 The
prosecutor argued in closing that there was a one in 5000 chance that a
random person would have scalp hair like Huf's, and a one in 5000 chance
that the random person would have pubic hair like Huf's, and thus the
likelihood of anyone having both of the same kinds of hair was one in 5000
times one in 5000 via the product rule.- 1 The court agreed that the prose-
cutor's argument was "misleading"'' without specifying how. The court
then held, however, that any error was harmless because of the other strong
evidence in the case against the defendant and because the expert's testimony
was strong in its inclusive/eliminative effect, even without the prosecutorial
overstatement .- 3 Although it is difficult to figure out why the court believed
the prosecutor's argument to be "misleading," probably the best explanation
is that the court was not satisfied that the head and pubic hair statistics
were mutually independent. While the court was concerned with mutual
independence, it did not seem concerned with the underlying validity of the
expert's statistics or with the possibility of unfair prejudice.
An intriguing 1986 Iowa case is State v. Klindt.24 A husband was
charged with murdering his wife by killing her, dismembering her, and then
throwing her into the Mississippi River. A torso later turned up downstream
which could not be positively identified as the defendant's wife. At trial,
the state undertook to show the probability that the body was the wife of
the defendant by asserting that the torso contained a combination of genetic
markers that would be found in only twenty-seven out of 10,000 people.
The state apparently could not, however, find any known samples of the
alleged victim's blood with which to compare the genetic markers found in
the torso, so the state took samples of the alleged victim's parents' blood,
which allowed an expert to calculate that the parents of the defendant's wife
248. Williams, 251 Ga. at 786, 312 S.E.2d at 73.
249. 675 P.2d 268 (Alaska Crim. App. 1984).
250. Huf v. State, 675 P.2d 268, 269 (Alaska Crim. App. 1984).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 269-70.
254. 389 N.W.2d 670 (Iowa 1986).
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were 107.8 times more likely than a random couple to have produced an
offspring with the genetic markers found in the torso. The really creative
portion of the prosecution's presentation, however, was in calling a statis-
tician to testify that the torso was very likely to be that of the defendant's
wife. Investigating officers had developed a list of all white females who
had been reported missing in a four-state area bordering on the upper
Mississippi River as of April 16, 1983, the date the torso was discovered.Y55
The list originally contained the names of seventeen persons, but was
narrowed by eliminating those who had obviously identifying characteristics
such as scars. Four missing women remained on the list, including the alleged
victim. The statistician was provided with data concerning the race, sex, age
range, and blood type of the torso, that the torso had borne a child, had
had an episiotomy, and had not been surgically sterilized. The alleged victim
was not excluded by any of these factors. The statistician obtained some
information concerning these characteristics regarding the other three missing
women, and, using data on the frequency of some of these conditions among
the general population from statistics provided by the United States Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, plus the genetic marker evidence,
testified that the probability was over ninety-nine percent that the torso was
the alleged victim's rather than any of the other three missing women. The
appellate opinion is ambiguous regarding exactly what information was
obtained by the statistician and how he used it to reach the final probability.
6
The Iowa Supreme Court found the testimony to have been properly admitted
because the underlying data was "adequately established" and "this back-
ground evidence was of a type which could reasonably be relied upon by
experts in the field."11 57 The court distinguished Collins because the testimony
in the case before it "did not purport to identify the perpetrator of a crime,
as in Collins. It did not even purport to show the torso was actually Joyce
Klindt's. It only showed that the chances were much stronger that the torso
was Joyce's than of any of the other three missing women."2 8 The court
was certainly being disingenuous in this last statement-if the evidence did
not purport to show that the torso was actually the alleged victim's, then it
was irrelevant. Further, while it is true that the testimony did not purport
to identify the culprit, but rather the victim, the issues of who were the
perpetrator and the victim were virtually synonymous in the case because if
the torso was found to be that of the defendant's wife, there were no other
suspects for the murder other than the defendant. As to the court's holding
that the foundational statistics and the expert's manipulation of them were
proper, it is difficult to critique that holding given that the specifics of what
the expert did are not apparent from the opinion. It is apparent, however,
255. It cannot be ascertained from the opinion how far back in time the officers went to
develop this list.
256. State v. Klindt, 389 N.W.2d 670, 673 (Iowa 1986).
257. Id.
258. Id. at 674.
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that the court ignored two factors regarding the foundation that seem to be
quite significant. First, the database was limited to a four-state area even
though it is certainly possible that the torso belonged to a person who would
have been reported missing in some other state. Second, the database was
limited to those persons who had been reported missing, while it was certainly
possible that the torso belonged to someone who had not been reported
missing. Thus, there was a significant likelihood that the final pool of four
candidates was incomplete. Even the addition of one more candidate to the
pool could have radically changed the calculation.
The final case in this category is the 1988 Wisconsin case State v.
Pankow. 9 The defendant, who babysat for children in her home, had three
infants die in her care during a five-year period. She was charged with
murder. Her defense was that the children had all died of Sudden Infant
Death Syndrome ("SIDS"). At trial the state undertook to demonstrate how
improbable it would be for three such deaths to have occurred in one
household. To do so it called a statistician who was asked to determine the
probability of three infants dying of SIDS in the same household during a
five-year period given that twenty children were cared for in the home, the
deaths occurred after nine o'clock in the morning, and the children were
over six months of age. The statistician was also supplied with "certain
generally accepted data: two SIDS deaths occur per 1000 live births; 90%
of SIDS deaths occur under six months of age; and 90% of SIDS deaths
occur between midnight and nine o'clock in the morning."' The statistician
calculated that the probability of the natural occurrence of three such deaths
would be 1000 times smaller than 9.1 in one trillion, or stated differently,
that such an event would occur at random once every 600,000 years.2 1 The
Wisconsin Court of Appeals found that the underlying statistics were derived
from generally accepted data, and that the case was different from most of
its probabilistic predecessors because the evidence was not introduced to
prove identity or to prove cause, but merely to meet the defense theory that
the deaths were attributable to SIDS.62 The court here, like the Iowa Supreme
Court in Klindt, is being disingenuous regarding the purpose for which the
evidence was offered. Since the evidence was offered to rebut the defense
theory concerning the cause of death, it is hard to see how the court could
conclude that the evidence was not being offered to support the prosecution's
claim that the defendant was the cause of death. From a statistical standpoint,
the major factor ignored by the court was that there was apparently no
showing that the three statistical figures used by the statistician were mutually
independent.
Cases in this category show that prosecutors are still beguiled by the
power of numbers. The cases also show that not all courts have been as
259. 144 Wis. 2d 23, 422 N.W.2d 913 (Ct. App. 1988).
260. State v. Pankow, 144 Wis. 2d 23, 37-38, 422 N.W.2d 913, 918 (Ct. App. 1988).
261. Id. at 38, 422 N.W.2d at 918.
262. Id.
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:741
skeptical as the Collins court regarding foundational matters and prejudicial
effect. Further, the cases tend to show that courts do not have a strong
grasp of mathematics. The relative scarcity of cases in this category, however,
suggests that Collins has significantly deterred prosecutors from even at-
tempting to offer creative statistical evidence. Had Collins been decided
differently, one would expect a whole raft of creative uses of mathematical
evidence appearing in appellate opinions in criminal cases.
2. Category Four: Non-Empirical Probabilities of Guilt Developed
Without Empirical Statistics and Without Bayes' Theorem
The characteristics of evidence in this category are that the statistics
have no plausible basis in empirical research, that the resulting probability
of a random match is so miniscule as to realistically leave the defendant as
the only possible culprit, and that Bayes' Theorem is not used. It is more
clear here than in category three that a prosecution argument that it is
merely using the evidence in nonprobabilistic fashion to eliminate all possible
alternatives inconsistent with guilt should not be accepted. By probabilizing
evidence as to which no empirical statistics exist, it seems clear that prose-
cutors seek to induce juries to reason toward a subjective probability of
guilt. Collins and its less illustrious predecessors (Risley, Miller and Sneed)
stand squarely against admission of evidence in this category. Collins is so
generally approved and respected that one would expect its deterrent effect
to render the number of cases in this category minimal. This deterrent effect
is borne out by the fact that only five cases subsequent to Collins fall into
this category. One would also expect that these cases would not pass appellate
muster, but surprisingly in two of the cases prosecution techniques that seem
virtually identical to Collins have avoided reversal.
Let us begin, however, with two cases where the result was consistent
with Collins. The 1983 California case of People v. Cella26 is singular in
that it is the only case where the defendant was offering mathematical
evidence against the prosecution. Cella was being investigated for white collar
crimes. A state agent made an illegal search from which he made up a list
of ten nonexistent companies that were then turned over to the state. Months
later the state served several search warrants against the defendant, one of
which contained a list of ten nonexistent companies in the same order as
had been provided by the agent as a result of the earlier illegal search. The
defendant argued that the later search warrant must have been a result of
the earlier illegal search and, thus, evidence obtained by the later search
should have been suppressed. In support of this argument, he offered the
testimony of a mathematician that the chances were two or three in 100,000
that a list of ten items would randomly appear in the same order twice. 264
The California Court of Appeals found that the trial judge had properly
rejected the evidence:
263. 139 Cal. App. 3d 391, 188 Cal. Rptr. 675 (1983).
264. People v. Cella, 139 Cal. App. 3d 391, 404, 188 Cal. Rptr. 675, 683 (1983).
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Such technique blindly overlooks such profound problems of inte-
grating mathematic purity with the countless nomnathematic varia-
bles that exist in reality. It quantifies with deceptive exactitude "fuzzy
imponderables." If mathematical probabilities are to be of any use
in the courtroom setting, all crucial variables must be quantified
exactly .... There could be any number of reasons, not quantified
by the mathematician, why 10 corporate names would appear twice
in the same order. Our duty does not include speculation as to the
quality of proof to be gained from misapplied statistics. 25
Accordingly, the court sustained the conviction.
In another California white collar crime case in 1984, People v. Louie,
266
the defendant, a physician, was charged with making false statements to
obtain or affect unemployment benefits. The prosecution sought to prove
that the defendant had submitted diagnoses of vague, impossible-to-check-
on sorts of illnesses at a much higher rate than other physicians. His diagnoses
on 196 disability claims were categorized and then compared with the number
of diagnoses filed by other health practitioners in the vicinity. The defendant
had filed many more claims in each category than had been filed in total
by the other practitioners with whom he was compared. Not content to rest
with this, the prosecution called a mathematics professor who testified that
the likelihood that random chance accounted for the differential in diagnoses
in the first three categories was three in ten million, and that the likelihood
as to the first four categories was "off the tables." 267 The California Court
of Appeals held that the statistics lacked foundation because there were a
host of real world factors that could account for the defendant's patient
population having different characteristics than those of other physicians.
268
The court thus found the testimony "utterly useless as proof of criminal
intent." 269
Of the two cases that seem non-Collins-like in their approach, a 1987
Illinois case, People v. Prewitt,270 can probably be explained by virtue of
the fact that the defendant had not objected to the probabilistic testimony
at trial and thus the question before the court was whether the admission
of the testimony was plain error. Exactly what the prosecution had argued
is unclear from the appellate opinion, which simply states that, "Starting
from the proposition that 20% of the population are non-secretors and by
assigning the defendant's individual characteristics with certain probabilities,
the prosecutor deduced that defendant, being a non-secretor, was certainly
the offender. Aside from the initial proposition, the prosecutor based his
theory entirely on conjecture." 271 The court found the prosecutor's approach
265. Id. at 405, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 684.
266. 158 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 28, 205 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1984).
267. People v. Louie, 158 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 28, 41, 205 Cal. Rptr. 247, 257 (1984).
268. Id. at 47-48, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 261-62.
269. Id. at 48, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
270. 160 I11. App. 3d 942, 513 N.E.2d 977 (1987).
271. People v. Prewitt, 160 I11. App. 3d 942, 948, 513 N.E.2d 977, 981 (1987).
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not to be prejudicial enough to constitute plain error because the trial judge
had instructed the jury that closing arguments are not evidence. 272 In reaching
this result, the court distinguished Collins by stating, "This is not a situation
wherein the prosecutor produced a mathematician or other expert witnesses
to testify to the veracity of the statistics. Such reference to expert testimony
may well unduly influence a jury. ' 273 This is a misreading of Collins because
the prosecutor in that case made clear that the expert was not testifying to
the "veracity of the statistics" but only to the veracity of the product rule.
Nonetheless, given that the procedural context of the case on appeal was
that the defendant had not objected to the mathematical approach at the
trial level, this case probably does not make great inroads against Collins.
A 1983 Indiana case, Roach v. State,274 though, appears to be a virtual
replay of Collins with a completely opposite result. There the defendant was
charged with burglary. Investigators at the scene found broken glass and
muddy shoe prints. Muddy shoes containing a sliver of glass were later seized
from the defendant. At trial the testimony was elicited from a lab technician
that the wear pattern on the seized shoes matched the shoe prints found at
the scene. Further, the lab technician testified without any apparent foun-
dation that the chances were one in a 1000 that the glass from the bottom
of the seized shoes came from a source other than the glass at the burglary
scene. The prosecutor in closing argument used this testimony in a way that
is so strikingly Collins-like that it is worthy of a substantial quotation:
The testimony clearly was by Bruce Boaz, the lab technician, that
mathematically the chances are one in one thousand that the glass
from the bottom of [Roach's] shoes came from other than a common
source. A thousand to one that, this glass goes with the exhibit from
the scene. Next we've got testimony about footprints, footprints
again found at the scene out in the muddy field. The testimony was
that, by Officer Stump, that these shoes found on the feet of Tim
Roach matched the size, the wear and the general tread of the prints
that he found in that field. What's the possibility first that the
individual who was at this scene, if it wasn't Tim Roach, had the
same size shoes? I don't know what the chances are. One in a
hundred, one in fifty, one in twenty-five? How about one in ten?
Next what is the possibility that an individual out there had the
same wear pattern on the bottom of his shoes that Mr. Roach did?
The shoes were worn and showed to be worn out in the same way
that the shoes that Mr. Roach had. Again, one in a hundred, one
in fifty, one in twenty-five? Let's be fair. How about one in ten? I
don't know. Put any value that you think. What's the chance that
some random individual out there at the scene had the same shoes
272. Id. at 948, 513 N.E.2d at 982.
273. Id. at 948, 513 N.E.2d at 981.
274. 451 N.E.2d 388 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
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with the same tread pattern? Again, I don't know. One in a hundred?
Let's go with one in ten.
These are assumptions. I'll grant you that. But you put the amount
in there that you think. Okay. What's the chance, then, that these
footprints were the same size and the same wear pattern and the
same tread pattern and belonged to somebody else? Multiply those
out. One, two, three zeroes. One in a thousand? Maybe that's a
little heavy. Let's try one in a hundred, to be reasonable about it.
Next what's the possibility that this individual with glass in his shoe
had the same footprints and ultimately ended up in the Defendant's
car? The Defendant's car found at this particular scene. Again, I
don't know. What is the possibility? One in a thousand? One in a
hundred? I don't know. Be fair. How about one in a hundred? One
in ten? I don't know. Put any value that you feel. Taking these and
using the fair figures, one in a thousand here on the glass, what's
the possibility that all these things happened, all these circumstances
happened all at the same time? One in a thousand here. One in a
hundred here. One In [sic] a hundred here. I don't know. Maybe
it's a little bit more. Maybe it's a little bit less. But using these
amounts, there's three, four, five, six, seven zeroes. One in ten
million, chances of all these things happening.
In a strikingly un-Collins-like opinion, the Indiana Court of Appeals upheld
the conviction:
Although prosecutors may not argue facts not in evidence, they may
properly argue their own analysis of the evidence. In assigning
probabilities to the various pieces of evidence, the prosecutor did
not state as a fact that any specific probability was correct. The
only exception was the probability that glass in Roach's shoe would
match glass found at the scene-estimated by the state's expert as
one in a thousand. Thus, the prosecutor merely supplied a method
of analyzing the evidence in the record, leaving the jurors free to
assign any statistical probability to the various facts. The prosecutor
did not improperly state facts not in evidence here; thus, we find
no prosecutorial misconduct.275
The court sought to distinguish Collins because in the case before it the
jurors had not been "required to accept unproven assumptions as facts.
2 76
In so stating the court ignored the fact that neither were the jurors in Collins
required to accept the calculations as fact; indeed, they were urged to develop
their own calculations. While the court indicated that it would be unwilling
to allow the equation of mathematical probability with proof beyond a
275. Roach v. State, 451 N.E.2d 388, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
276. Id.
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reasonable doubt, it rather implausibly found that the prosecutor had not
attempted to equate the two in his argument. 277 Either the court in this case
was not thinking carefully and clearly, or it was buying into most of the
premises of the probabilist position.
The other case in this category does not involve the use of mathematical
evidence at trial; rather, it involves an appellate judge analyzing a case in a
manner strikingly like that argued for by the prosecutor in Collins. The
defendant had been convicted of murder and sexual assault. Several pieces
of evidence, including a fingerprint, a comb, some hair, and car keys placed
him at the victim's home. On appeal, the defendant argued that the evidence
was insufficient to support the conviction. In rejecting this argument, Judge
Posner reasoned as follows:
Suppose that the probability that the fingerprint was not his (or, as
he argues, was put on the can months earlier when he was shopping
in the store where it was bought) is .01 (a generous estimate); the
probability that the comb was not his is .50; the probability that
the hair was not his is .30; and the probability that someone else
discarded Miss Ayer's car keys near his mother's house is .05. Then,
assuming these probabilities are independent of each other, the
probability that Rowan was not in Miss Ayer's house at a time near
when she died is only .000075 (.01 x .50 x .30 x .05), which is less
than 100th of one percent .... True, it would not follow that he
had killed her; someone else might have entered the house before
or after him, and done the deed. But that is exceedingly unlikely
... and does not cast substantial doubt on his guilt.278
Thus, probabilist hearts beat not only within the chests of prosecutors, but
some judges as well.
3. Category Five: Non-Empirical Probabilities of Guilt Incorporating
Empirical Statistics Via Bayes' Theorem
The scholarly debate regarding Bayes' Theorem dates back to Finkelstein
and Fairley's article in 1970.279 Finkelstein and Fairley posed the hypothetical
where a woman has been found murdered, there is some non-mathematical
evidence pointing to her boyfriend, and the police have found a palm print
at the scene which would match only one out of every 1000 people, including
the defendant. 20 Finkelstein and Fairley advocated using Bayes' Theorem to
portray to the jury the effect that this evidence should have on their
assessment of the defendant's guilt.21l They proposed developing a table
illustrating what the posterior probability would be after application of
277. Id. at 393.
278. Rowan v. Owens, 752 F.2d 1186, 1188 (7th Cir. 1984).
279. Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 23.
280. Id. at 496.
281. Id. at 498.
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Bayes' Theorem based upon differing prior probabilities. In the case of the
palm print, if the jurors had a prior probability of guilt based on the
nonmathematical evidence of ten percent, the palm print evidence should
increase that probability of guilt to 99.1 percent. If the prior probability
were fifty percent, the posterior probability should be 99.9 percent. If the
prior probability were seventy-five percent, the posterior probability should
be 99.96 percent3m Finkelstein and Fairley argued that this was a perfectly
legitimate way of assessing the impact of new evidence.
Professor Lawrence Tribe took issue with Finkelstein and Fairley.23 He
argued that there were two insurmountable legal barriers to Finkelstein and
Fairley's proposal. First, he argued that the application of Bayes' Theorem
would require the jurors to formulate prior probabilities of guilt before all
the evidence was in, whereas the presumption of innocence requires the
jurors to believe completely in the defendant's innocence until they retire to
the jury room to deliberate.2 Second, Tribe argued in conformance with
the anti-probabilists' position that such use of Bayes' Theorem would tend
to quantify the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof, which is
legally impermissible:
In short, to say that society recognizes the necessity of tolerating
the erroneous "conviction of some innocent suspects in order to
assure the confinement of a vastly larger number of guilty criminals"
is not at all to say that society does, or should, embrace a policy
that juries, conscious of the magnitude of their doubts in a particular
case, ought to convict in the face of this acknowledged and quantified
uncertainty. It is to the complex difference between these two
propositions that the concept of "guilt beyond a reasonable doubt"
inevitably speaks. The concept signifies not any mathematical meas-
ure of the precise degree of certitude we require of juries in criminal
cases, but a subtle compromise between the knowledge, on the one
hand, that we cannot realistically insist on acquittal whenever guilt
is less than absolutely certain, and the realization, on the other
hand, that the cost of spelling that out explicitly and with calculated
precision in the trial itself would be too high.25 (emphasis added.)
Finkelstein and Fairley responded to these two arguments .86 As to the
argument that formation of a prior probability was inconsistent with the
presumption of innocence, they argued that jurors are constantly evaluating
and reevaluating the probability of the defendant's guilt throughout the
282. Id. at 500.
283. Tribe, supra note 31.
284. Id. at 1368-72. This objection has been echoed by other commentators. See, e.g.,
Cohen, supra note 37, at 100; Jaffee, supra note 26, at 968, 971, 987; Jaffee, supra note 7, at
983; Tyree, supra note 176, at 234.
285. Tribe, supra note 31, at 1375.
286. Finkelstein & Fairley, A Comment On "Trial By Mathematics", 84 HAgv. L. REV.
1801 (1971).
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trial.8 7 As to the argument that Bayes' Theorem would impermissibly quan-
tify the burden of persuasion, Finkelstein and Fairley argued that the burden
was in fact probabilistic, and that in any event the probability in their
hypothetical concerned the likelihood of a trace having been made by the
defendant, not the likelihood of the defendant's guilt.28
Professor Tribe also put forth three reasons to doubt that jurors were
competent to deal with evidence in the way advocated by Finkelstein and
Fairley. First, he argued that jurors would find it impossible to assign prior
probabilities. 289 Second, Tribe argued that jurors would be unable to ignore
the mathematical evidence in forming their prior probability and thus would
tend to "double count" the significance of the mathematical evidence.29°
Third, Tribe argued that the mathematical evidence would tend to "dwarf
the soft variables":291
The syndrome is a familiar one: if you can't count it, it doesn't
exist. Equipped with a mathematically powerful intellectual machine,
even the most sophisticated user is subject to an overwhelming
temptation to feed his pet the food it can most comfortably digest.
Readily quantifiable factors are easier to process-and hence more
likely to be recognized and then reflected in the outcome-than are
factors that resist ready quantification. The result, despite what turns
out to be a spurious appearance of accuracy and completeness, is
likely to be significantly warped and hence highly suspect.
29
1
Finkelstein and Fairley responded by arguing that jurors could easily enough
form prior probabilities. 2 3 As to the "dwarfing of soft variables" argument,
Finkelstein and Fairley contended that the mathematical evidence concerning
the trace evidence is certainly admissible in the case without Bayes' Theorem,
and thus it only makes sense to use Bayes' Theorem to help the jury give
proper weight to the evidence that they might otherwise misevaluate.
294
One reason why Tribe's article has stood the test of time is that it
formulated many of the anti-probabilist arguments in a manner that has
never been improved upon. Tribe, however, was only partially anti-proba-
bilistic. He did not contest the validity of probabilistic calculations, but
instead argued that the costs of using them in the trial process would be
287. Id. at 1808. See also Friedman, supra note 56, at 734 n.6 (not inconsistent with
presumption of innocence for jurors to assign a positive, albeit tiny, prior probability to
defendant's guilt); Lempert, supra note 49, at 464 (appropriate for jurors to start with a prior
probability of one over one less than the number of persons in the world).
288. Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 23, at 1808-09.
289. Tribe, supra note 31, at 1358-59. See also Braun, supra note 7, at 50-51.
290. Tribe, supra note 31, at 1366-68.
291. Id. at 1361.
292. Id. at 1361-62.
293. Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 23, at 1802-03. See also Kaye, supra note 31, at 42,
52-53.
294. Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 23, at 1806.
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too great. 29' Thus, he did not mention one important argument that anti-
probabilists who completely reject the validity of probabilists' tenets in the
proof process have later proffered. That argument, which has already been
mentioned, 29 is that multiplication with respect to items of evidence is
inappropriate because each item of evidence is an all-or-nothing proposition:
if it is believed, then other items of evidence based thereon can be considered,
whereas if it is rejected, the line of reasoning ends.
These debates concerning the applicability of Bayes' Theorem to the
trial process have consumed countless law review pages. With respect to the
case law, however, Bayes' Theorem rarely turns up. The only context in
which Bayes' Theorem has been utilized is in sex offense cases where the
alleged victim became pregnant and delivered a child, allegedly as a result
of illegal sexual activity, and the prosecution attempts to prove that the
defendant was the father by use of mathematical evidence. In such cases, in
addition to a probability of a random match (known in the paternity area
as the "probability of exclusion") and a "paternity index," the ratio that
compares the alleged father's likelihood of producing the child's phenotypes
with the likelihood of a random man selected by police doing so,29 a third
probability known as the "probability of paternity" can be calculated. First,
a prior probability of paternity is developed. Then the "paternity index"
can be used as the other input into Bayes' Theorem to arrive at a posterior
"probability of paternity." Three courts in criminal cases have addressed
the admissibility of such a "probability of paternity." 29 In a 1983 case, the
Minnesota Supreme Court, the most anti-probabilist court in the country,
cited Professor Tribe in holding a probability of paternity to be inadmissible
in the criminal case: "[T]here is a real danger that the jury will use the
evidence as a measure of probability of the defendant's guilt or innocence,
and that the evidence will thereby undermine the presumption of innocence,
erode the values served by the reasonable doubt standard, and dehumanize
our system of justice. ' 2 9 In a 1988 case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
295. See supra note 41.
296. See supra text accompanying note 37.
297. For a discussion of these two probabilities, see supra note 198 and accompanying
text.
298. Two other cases used the term "probability of paternity" but upon examination of
the evidence that was offered, it appears that they actually involve either a "probability of
exclusion" or a "paternity index." People v. Alzoubi, 133 Ill. App. 3d 806, 479 N.E.2d 1208
(1985); State v. Thompson, 503 A.2d 689 (Me. 1986).
299. State v. Boyd, 331 N.W.2d 480 (Minn. 1983). Although it is unclear from the opinion
what prior probability the expert witness used in coming to the "probability of paternity", it
seems likely that he used the normal assumption of such experts that there was a 5001o prior
probability of the defendant's paternity. Even probabilists reject this arbitrary 50% figure and
argue that the prior probability should depend on the jurors' assessment of the nonmathematical
evidence in the particular case. See, e.g., Ellman & Kaye, supra note 172, at 1149-52. Nonetheless,
one court in a civil case has mandated the use of the 50% prior probability because permitting
the jury to form its own prior probability would be too confusing. Commonwealth v. Beausoleil,
397 Mass. 206, 490 N.E.2d 788, 797 n.19 (1986).
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found that while the "probability of exclusion" and the "paternity index"
could be admitted at trial, the "probability of paternity," "although clearly
relevant," could not be admitted because, "[I]t is antithetical to our system
of justice to allow the state, through the use of statistical evidence which
assumes that the defendant committed the crime, to prove that the defendant
committed the crime. Because the probability of paternity assumes the fact
that it is used to prove, it is inadmissible."00 It is not clear what the court
meant by this statement. One possibility is that the application of Bayes'
Theorem requires a prior probability of guilt, which is legally impermissible.
Another possibility is that the calculation assumes that the defendant had
intercourse with the child's mother.
A 1987 decision by the North Carolina Supreme Court is apparently the
only decision having permitted Bayes' Theorem to be used in a criminal
case.310 There, an expert used Bayes' Theorem to show how the genetic
evidence would affect the jurors' prior probabilities at the "weak end" level,
at the medial level, and at the high range.3 2 The only objection raised by
the defendant was that the expert had been allowed to go further and give
her subjective opinion that he was the father, and thus the court's apparent
approval of the prosecution's approach is merely dicta.30 3 Nonetheless, the
court did state, "In the present case, Dr. McMahan's testimony on the use
of the [probability of paternity] was unquestionably of assistance to the trier
of fact." 3°4 Thus, the North Carolina Supreme Court became the first and
so far only court to approve of the use of Bayes' Theorem in a criminal
case.
Some of the social science research speaks to the possible impact of
Bayesian calculations upon jurors. Finkelstein and Fairley suggested that the
question whether jurors will be helped, misled, or confused by the application
of Bayes' Theorem was a topic that should be subjected to empirical
research. 05 One recent study has been specifically directed to that question.1
6
This study by Faigman and Balgioni was conducted on 180 volunteers enrolled
in continuing adult education courses at several community colleges in
Virginia. The volunteers were asked to read a transcript regarding evidence
in a breaking-and-entering case where the culprit had cut himself on broken
glass from the window used to enter the store. The transcript contained
direct and cross-examination of three witnesses who did not give mathematical
evidence: the arresting officer; an eyewitness who saw a car similar to the
300. State v. Hartman, 145 Wis. 2d 1, 15-16, 426 N.W.2d 320, 326 (Wis. App. 1988).
301. State v. Jackson, 320 N.C. 452, 358 S.E.2d 679 (1987).
302. Id. at 459, 358 S.E.2d at 682. The odd thing about the report of the expert's testimony
is that Bayes' Theorem was used to calculate the "paternity index" when in fact the "paternity
index" is one of the inputs into Bayes' Theorem to arrive at the "probability of paternity."
Whether the expert, the court, or both were confused is impossible to ascertain.
303. Id. at 459-60, 358 S.E.2d at 682-83. The court agreed with this argument.
304. Id. at 460, 358 S.E.2d at 683.
305. Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 286, at 1806.
306. Faigman & Baglioni, supra note 179.
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one driven by the defendant outside of the scene of the crime; and the
defendant, who gave vague and inconsistent testimony regarding merchandise
that might have been stolen in the break-in that was found in his apartment,
his whereabouts on the night of the burglary, and where he had received
cuts on his arm (allegedly from his construction job). Then a physician who
had taken a blood sample from the defendant testified that the defendant's
blood type under the ABO system matched that found at the scene, and
told the jurors what percentage of the population had that particular blood
type. Finally, a statistician testified regarding how Bayes' Theorem would
evaluate the blood grouping evidence. He presented a chart to the jurors
that displayed four prior probabilities ranging from one percent to eighty
percent and their accompanying posterior probabilities.3°7 There were two
variations in the experiment. One related to the type of blood to which the
physician testified: one group of subjects received testimony that the defen-
dant's blood type of A was possessed by forty percent of the population;
the second group that the defendant's blood type of 0 was possessed by
twenty percent of the population; and a third group that the defendant's
blood type of AB was possessed by five percent of the population. The
second variation related to the "probes" inserted in the materials by the
researchers. On each probe the subjects were asked to state the likelihood
that the blood found in the stereo shop was the defendant's blood; were
asked two questions specific to the testimony given just prior to the probe;
and were asked to make a determination of guilt based on the evidence
already heard. For some of the subjects these probes were placed in three
places-before the physician's statistical evidence, after the physician's sta-
tistical evidence, and after the statistician's testimony. For a second group
the probes were placed only after the physician's statistical evidence and
after the statistician's testimony. As to a third group of subjects, the probe
was placed only after the statistician's testimony. °0
The numerical results of the Faigman and Baglioni study are not easy
to synopsize (unlike those in the Thompson and Schumann studies)3°9 because
Faigman and Baglioni used more sophisticated mathematical tools, such as
standard deviations, to evaluate the responses. The conclusions reached by
Faigman and Baglioni, then, are easier to state in prose than in numerical
terms. First, they found that virtually all of the respondents "significantly
underutilized" the statistical evidence.
3 10
Indeed, except in the AB blood-group condition (i.e., presented with
the 5% figure) and where the subjects explicitly stated a prior
307. Id. at 5-6.
308. Id. at 6-7.
309. See supra notes 216-22 and accompanying text.
310. Faigman & Baglioni, supra note 179, at 13. This, of course, marks Faigman and
Baglioni as probabilists since their conclusion that the respondents "underutilized" the evidence
was based upon their findings that the respondents did not make as much of the evidence as
Bayes' Theorem would indicate.
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probability (i.e., the three-probe condition), respondents virtually
ignored the statistical evidence. Further, the subjects did not conform
to the expectations of either critics [citing Tribe] or proponents
[citing Finkeistein & Fairley] of the courtroom use of Bayes' theorem;
they were not overwhelmed by this statistical theorem, nor did they
accept the statistician's conclusions. Overall, subjects who estimated
a prior probability on the first probe revised their estimates after
the statistician testified as did subjects who estimated a prior prob-
ability at the end of the transcript. Yet, for both of these groups,
the revisions remain significantly below the probabilities about which
the statistician had testified (i.e., a Bayesian model)."'
Second, Faigman and Balgioni concluded that requiring the subjects to state
a prior probability before the physician testified sensitized subjects to the
blood group evidence and made them more likely to give greater weight to
that evidence. "This finding suggests that explicit quantification of the
nonstatistical evidence may increase the utilization of the statistical evi-
dence.13 12 Third, the researchers concluded that there was no evidence to
support Professor Tribe's assertion that jurors were likely to "double count"
the mathematical evidence by letting it contaminate their prior probability. 13
Finally, Faigman and Baglioni concluded that while the respondents on
average viewed the statistician's testimony as accurate, they did not give it
very much weight. "The statistician was only given as much weight as the
eyewitness, who admitted to drinking the night of the burglary, and the
defendant, whom the subject saw, on average, as only 36% likely to be
telling the truth .... Apparently, subjects felt as the following subjects
succinctly put it: 'I personally don't put much weight on statistical deductions
as proof of anything.' 31 4 Faigman and Baglioni, as good probabilists,
concluded their report as follows: "The results ... suggest, contrary to
Tribe's assertion, that an expert's Bayesian formulation will not overwhelm
the average trier of fact. Courts, it seems, should be less concerned with
jurors being overwhelmed by the complexity of statistical techniques and
more concerned with impressing upon jurors the relevance of those tech-
niques."3 5 Anti-probabilists, on the other hand, contend that it shows the
innate wisdom of juries that they do not reason in Bayesian or any other
probabilistic fashion.31 6
CONCLUSION
It is the author's hope that this article has demonstrated three things
about mathematics in the criminal proof process. First, that the significance
311. Id. at 13-14.
312. Id. at 15.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 16.
316. Wright, supra note 36.
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of these issues is going to wax, not wane, as statistical data becomes
increasingly available. Thus, it behooves those involved in the legal system
to make the effort necessary to gain a basic understanding of the issues,
however unappetizing the prospect to those who are not mathematically
inclined. Second, while the topic is initially imposing to the non-mathemat-
ically inclined, it is understandable if one is willing to devote a modicum of
time and effort to master the basics. These include the mathematical tools-
the distinctions among data, statistics, and probabilities, the three theories
of probability and the two mathematical rules, the fundamentals of the
probabilist and anti-probabilist positions, and the Collins case. These basics
enable one to recognize and categorize mathematical evidence into one of
the five categories, and then to intelligently analyze the evidence's strengths
and weaknesses. Third and finally, an understanding of the basics empowers
the non-mathematically inclined to enter into the debate about the proper
role of mathematics in the proof process. This is too important a topic to
be left solely in the province of the mathematically sophisticated.

